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INTRODUCTION
The major legal issues raised by this appeal are: (1) whether, under the doctrine of
merger, the parties' written deeds extinguished any alleged oral contracts and rendered
inadmissible plaintiffs' parol evidence of such contracts, (2) whether plaintiffs' claimed
oral contracts are enforceable under the statute of frauds, and (3) whether plaintiffs'
claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations. A holding for the Warrs on any
one of these issues is sufficient to bar plaintiffs' claims in their entirety and as a matter of
law. Additional issues include (4) whether plaintiffs Wayne and Miriam Lewis have
privity of contract with the Warrs, and (5) whether the trial court awarded plaintiffs
excessive water rights.
The trial court determined that the parties entered into an oral contract for
conveyance of the Warrs' Irrigation Water as part of the purchase of plaintiffs' lots. R.
955 at 146. In an effort to support this finding, plaintiffs have re-argued in their brief
much of the parol evidence that they submitted to the trial court. The Court should not be
distracted from the legal issues presented in this appeal by plaintiffs' discussion of factual
questions that are not at issue here. While the Warrs continue to deny the existence of an
oral contract, they have not challenged the trial court's factual findings in this appeal.1
Rather, the Warrs maintain that the trial court never should have speculated on this
factual question, because plaintiffs' claims are barred as a matter of law regardless of the
existence or non-existence of any oral contract they might claim.
1

Because the Warrs do not challenge the trial court's findings of fact in this appeal, they
are not required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) to marshal the evidence in support of those
findings. Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7,117 n.4, 994 P.2d 193 ("[T]he marshaling
requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law.").
148961.4
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The trial court erred by attempting to reach back six to thirteen years to ascertain the
terms of oral representations allegedly made prior to plaintiffs' purchase of lots, where the
parties have subsequently reduced their agreement to written contracts and have executed
and recorded written deeds in performance of their agreement. The doctrine of merger, the
parole evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations were specifically
designed to prevent trial courts from jeopardizing litigants' real property rights upon
doubtful factual determinations such as the one made by the trial court below. The courts
and the Legislature have established these principles as a legal framework within which
courts must resolve real property disputes without resorting to unreliable factual inquiries
as to who said what at some time six to thirteen years in the past.
Unfortunately, the trial judge ignored this legal framework and instead ordered the
distribution of the Warrs' water rights based on his own finding of oral contract and his
own notion of the equities. As a matter of law, however, any oral contract found by the
trial court is unenforceable without additional findings to take the contract out of the
doctrine of merger, the parol evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the statute of
limitations. The trial court made none of these required findings, because there was no
evidence to support such findings. The trial court nevertheless ordered specific
performance of the oral contract it believed it had found. By ignoring the requirements of
the law, the trial court's judgment does serious violence to the legal protections of property
rights erected by this Court. There is nothing to distinguish this case from the Court's
established precedents barring claims under the doctrine of merger, the parol evidence rule,
the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations. Therefore, any affirmance of the trial
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weakening or eliminating these established legal protections, and placing property rijr lis
instead within the discretionary fact-finding powers of the State's trial judges, i he W ans
In (Iiiii appeal as! lis I mill I luinllln n aillill iiiiiill IIIIIII|IIIIII III! Ilia law
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMED ORAL CONTRACTS ARE MERGED AND
EXTINGUISHED IN THE PARTIES' WARRANTY DEEDS
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the extinguishment of their claii i is 1 indei the docti ine of

merger by arguing that this issue was not properly raised before the trial court and that their
alleged oral terms for conveying title to the Irrigation Water were collateral to the convey-

raised before the trial court, w Inch ruled on this issue and thereby preserved it for appeal.
Further, the collateral rights exception does not apply to contract terms relating to title.

The rule for preservation of an issue for appellate review, as recited by plaintiffs, is
that "a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue." Badger v. Brooklyn

there can be no question that the trial court was afforded an opportunity to rule on the
merger doctrine because in fact it did rule on this issue from the bench and again in its
Jiki^iiicnl, ill !"IlliIIiiinji1" (ciToiieouslvl lh<il llie merger (Inch me did in nil apply because tlic pan lies

did not intend their deeds to be an integration of their contracts. R. 955 at 147; R. 920.
Plaintiffs cite Badger for the proposition that an issue must be raised in a timely

148961.4
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an opportunity to rule on it. Appellants' Br. at 22 n.8, citing Badger, 966 P.2d at 847.
These requirements obviously apply in cases like Badger where a party is appealing an
issue not ruled upon in the forum below, but there is no need to prove that the court had an
opportunity to rule on an issue when the court has actually ruled on it. Moreover, the
Warrs specifically raised the merger doctrine in connection with their timely and
continuing objection to plaintiffs' introduction of parol evidence. R. 953 at 34. They
discussed the doctrine again in their closing argument, and supported their argument by
citation to authority.2 R. 955 at 118-23 citing Dubrowsky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1987). Although this issue might have been more fully briefed at an earlier point in the
litigation, this Court has repeatedly held that an issue is preserved for appeal, even if the
issue was not raised until after the trial, where the trial court considers and rules on the
merits of the issue. See State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993); State v. Belgard,
830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); State
v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). Where the issue is raised at trial and ruled
upon by the trial court there can be no question that it was adequately preserved.
B.

The Oral Terms Alleged by Plaintiffs Are Not Collateral to the
Conveyance of Title

Plaintiffs seek to avoid the extinguishment of their claims under the merger doctrine
2

The Warrs' also offered to provide the trial court with additional briefing on this issue,
but the court refused this briefing and ruled on its own understanding of the merger doctrine. R. 955 at 119, 145-46. Further, as plaintiffs acknowledge, the substance of the merger doctrine was raised in connection with the parol evidence rule in the Warrs' pre-trial
brief and opening arguments, where the Warrs argued that the deeds constituted the final
agreement between the parties as a matter of law. R. 702-03; R. 953 at 6-7. Because the
Warrs' argument under the merger doctrine is purely legal, there can have been no prejudice to the plaintiffs from the Court's consideration of the issue after the evidence was
closed.
148961.4
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lots in the written warranty deeds. See Appellees' Br. at 22-25. Plaintiffs' claim is
inconsistent with their own argument, maintained throughout this litigation, that the lots

consideration for the warranty deeds was intended to pay for title to both the lots and the
Irrigation Water. See R. 38-39, 150, 569, 682, 841, 935. Moreover, plaintiffs' claims do
i i : it fit * ithin the collateral i iglits exception because the oral terms they allege relate to title
and the parties' deeds directly address the si lbject c f wat : i i igl its Plaintiffs distoi t the • lav
of collateral terms in an attempt to make their claims fit within this exception.
1

As a Matter of Law, Terms Relating k\ I "it le Are Not Collateral

The collateral rights exception does not apply to contract terms relating to title
because such terms are, as a matter of law, central to the conveyance of title in the deeds
rather than collateral, v,,;./,, ..

lr

M-, «... .

.

. ,.

. MM-

\xy

":>

"he

law is well-established in this regard:
"The question of whether a specific term is or is not collateral, and hence
whether the term will or will not merge into the deed, is determined by the
intent of the parties." . . . However. Utah courts need not look to the parties'
intent on issues relating to title and encumbrances because such issues "relate
to the same subject matter as does the deed."
hi (emphasis added) (quoting Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986). Thus
..: „v

...

-a panics mia.:

irrelevant after delivery and acceptance of the deed" and "the merger doctrine "h cuiiau.^
rights exception . . . does not apply." Id (emphasis added); see also Dansic w Hi-Couicn
Estates Homeowners A*, n, i^99l J I " 62,1J 21, 98 > l ' 2d 30; Embassy (*roup, Inc v. h
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865 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d at 793. Because
plaintiffs' claimed oral contracts relate to title in the Warrs' Irrigation Water, such
contracts, to the extent they ever existed, are merged and extinguished by the parties' deeds
as a matter of law.
2.

The Warranty Deeds Explicitly Address the Subject of Water

Even if the collateral rights exception could be applied to terms relating to title, the
warranty deeds in this case indicate that title to water was not collateral to the title to
plaintiffs' lots. The warranty deeds given to each plaintiff describe all water rights
associated with the lots, and thereby manifest plainly that the subject of water rights was
not collateral to sale of the lots. For example, when plaintiffs Freddie and Karen Martinez
bought Lot 1 from the Warrs, the Warrs had already installed a well on Lot 1 and applied to
the State Engineer for certification of their water rights. R. 670.3 The warranty deed for
Lot 1 therefore conveys the water right together with the lot:
LOT 1, ROCKY TOP SUBDIVISION, A SUBDIVISION OF TOOELE
COUNTY, according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the
County Recorder of Tooele County, Utah. TOGETHER WITH WATER
RIGHT APPLICATION NO. 15-3242 (A61781) & 8" well, filed with the
State of Utah.
Tr. Ex. 62, (copy attached to Appellants' Br. at App. C). Thus, when the parties intended a
conveyance of water rights, they described those rights on the deed itself.
Further, all of the plaintiffs' warranty deeds incorporate the official plat, which
clearly provides: "Lot purchasers are responsible for . . . on-lot wells." Tr. Ex. 17 (copies

This, incidentally, explains why the Warrs advertised the sale of the Martinez' lot,
unlike the other lots, with "water, utilities." See Appellees' Br. at 1-2, 6. This fact was
acknowledged by stipulation of the parties, R. 670, and by the Martinez in their trial
testimony. R. 953 at 194-95, R. 954 at 15-16.
148961.4
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attacl led to \ppellants

..

-

(Warranty Deeds) (copies attached to Appellants' Br. as App C), This statem i"
constitutes an explicit limitation on the Warrs' responsibility to provide water to the lots.
This limitation is not collateral to the rights conveyed in the warranty deeds, but is a part of
'il'H <f( *hds themselves J M ' I V H 1 T """ M 'hni im

V< < ^./W" nnofhhih

h1 <

iui^^tl

Oil Co., 471 P.2d 148, 149-50 (Utah 1970) ("When lands are granted according to an
official plat of a survey, the plat itself, w it! I all its notes, lines, descriptions and landmarks,
I ) r r n 111 r s , i<, 11111 m I i i 11 111 1 1 1 ' 1111 i" i 111 I 111 111 r i I 11 \ \ \ 1111 I i I I I \ l s

I in i n 11 \ <; \ i• 111
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descriptive features were written out on the face of the deed or grant itself").
**

Plaintiffs' Argument Distorts the Law of Collateral Terms

• - ni.nr r fi\ Norton^' • distor It tl ie la ( \ in ai i attei i ipt t :> in :t l a l :e the ^ollat

• • 'i

exception applicable to their claims. Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that contract terms arc
collateral (a) where performance of the terms is intended to take place after conveyance of

These assertions are not supported by the decisions of this Court, and manifest the plaintiffs9 plain misunderstanding of the doctrine of merger and the collateral rights exception.
a.

Where "I 'erms II elat e II: ci I itl e. tlr e I im e • ci f I "" E i fci t man ;: e lis
Immaterial

Plaintiffs rely on Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977), for the proposition
ill,in ui'iiliiid tail! i JiiiuM In tlaiiial i iill.iin'idl in ilini dci. 11 s wlicit: lln; pei lonuaiice ul
those terms is intended to take place at some time after the delivery of the deed. Appellees'
Br. at 24. Plaintiffs further claim that "in Dansie v Ili-Cowwy Estates Homeowners
k\ //,,9S7 V.2c *
148961.4
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.:.. -• .....i reiteratea u.. ioregoing standard.
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tiffs materially misrepresent the Court's holding in Dansie and the current state of the law.
The Dansie Court addressed the Stubbs decision but did not "reiterate" it. Rather, in
language omitted from the plaintiffs' brief, the Dansie Court pointed out that years earlier,
it had clarified and corrected the erroneous standard set forth in Stubbs. See Dansie, 1999
UT 62,fflf20-21, 987 P.2d 30 (copy attached to Addendum as App. A). In reality, this
Court in Dansie expressly rejected the same argument plaintiffs make here:
The Association argues that under Stubbs the language of the 1973 Contract
is not extinguished by the later deeds because the "1973 Contract requires the
buyers to become members of the Homeowners Association at some point
after the signing of the Contract. . . , it contemplates performance after the
delivery of the deed, and constitutes a collateral agreement."
However, nearly a decade after Stubbs, this court clarified the collateral
rights standard, holding that "covenants relating to title and encumbrances
are not considered to be collateral because they relate to the same subject
matter as does the deed." Secor [v. Knight], 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986)
(citation omitted). The contract language relied on by the Association here is
clearly a "covenant[ ] related to title and [an] encumbrance[ ]" upon the title
to the Property.
Id. (emphasis added). Because the disputed terms related to title, the Court held as a matter
of law that they were not collateral but were merged in the parties' deeds. Id. The Court's
decisions in Secor and Dansie make it clear that terms relating to title in real property are
not collateral to the deeds by which the property is conveyed, regardless of when
performance of those terms is intended to take place.
b.

Terms Omitted from the Deed Are Not Collateral

Plaintiffs argue that because the warranty deeds do not mention the Irrigation Water,
title to the Irrigation Water must, "by definition," be a different subject matter than the title
to their lots, and therefore collateral. Appellees' Br. at 24, quoting Dansie, 716 P.2d at
792. Plaintiffs seriously misconstrue the holding of Dansie. The "subject matter" referred
148961.4
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to in Dansie is the subject of " title i n i< i encumbrances" generally,, not just the n-.u io the
particular interests described in the dec/

- property 11 :)t mentioned in the -

definition" a different subject matter and therefore collateral to the conveyance in the deed,
then the collateral rights exception would swallow up the doctrine of merger, effectively
i Iiiiiiiii iliiit" ill Tin iiiinp 1 ! dm Www mil

.iiiscs when 111 Irnf i run r\ • .mm'thin; 1 diffi n u t

than the buyer thought it was buying or the seller thought it was selling. If a subject were
deemed to be collateral whenever it was left out of the deed, this exception would apply in

Water is not described in the deeds means that it was not conveyed, not that it is collateral
to the sale of the lots.
Ilie Parol Evidence Ruk
Extinguished Terms

<

,ed and

~" *ie plaintiffs' alleged oral contracts are subject to the doctrine of merger, then any
evidence ,A auc.\ contracts proffered
likewi-

*"/• c\c}

J

-

le purpose of contradicting me deedb ^r.v,-i...
i - -.

•

-,(1. *-,, • ... t ,!:

,nnli.* ' ' M

merger doctrine in conjunction with the parol evidence rule to exclude parol evidence of
contracts—whether written or oral- offered for the purpose of contradicting the terms of

Parol evidence of prior terms is inadmissible to contradict a valid, written deed,
because the deed represents the parties n i\u\ L integrated agreement as a matter of law. See

v the sense of being a separate interest in real property, the Irrigation Water is of course
"a different subject matter" than the lots. It is for this reason that the Irrigation Water must
also be purchased by a separate agreement and paid for with separate considers:< ^
148961.4
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inadmissible for the reason that such terms are merged in the deeds and the existence of
such merged terms is irrelevant to the parties' rights under the deed. See Reese Howell,
158 P. at 157 ("[T]he [trial] court did not err in rejecting appellant's offer of proof [of prior
contracts] upon the ground that it was immaterial, if for no other reason." (emphasis
added)); Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d at 450 ("[T]he parties' intent regarding Lot 15 [as
set forth in a prior agreement] is irrelevant after delivery and acceptance of the deed."
(emphasis added)). The trial court's finding that the deeds were not integrated is contrary
to settled law, and the court therefore erred by admitting and relying on plaintiffs' parol
evidence of contrary terms over the Warrs' objection.
D.

The Doctrine of Merger Must Be Strictly Enforced

The doctrine of merger must be rigorously maintained to preserve the integrity of
written deeds and to encourage the diligence of the parties. Secor, 716 P.2d at 795. If in
fact the plaintiffs believed that they should have acquired title to the Warrs' Irrigation
Water with the purchase of their lots, it was their duty to see that a covenant to that effect
was included in the deeds they purchased. Id. This Court has declared: "in the sales of
land, the law remits the party to his covenants in his deed; if... the party has not taken the
precaution to secure himself by covenants, he has no remedy for his money, even on failure
of title." Reese Howell Co., 158 P. at 689. The State's entire system of recorded
conveyances depends on the reliability and integrity of recorded deeds. The Court should
not permit that integrity to be compromised by plaintiffs' subsequent allegations of
additional oral terms contrary to the terms accepted and recorded in their written deeds.

148961.4
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PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
As plaintiffs acknowledge, a claimant seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under

the theory of part performance must show acts of part performance done in reliance on the
alleged oral contract such that "(a) they would not have been performed had the contract
not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promissor would result in fraud
on the performer who relied, since damages would be inadequate." Martin v. Scholl, 678
P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) (copy attached to Addendum as App. B) (quoted in Appellees'
Br. at 28). Plaintiffs do not even argue that damages would be inadequate to compensate
their alleged losses, and they utterly fail to show any action on their part that would not
have been performed absent the oral contract they allege.
A.

Plaintiffs Do Not Even Address the Requirement of Showing Their
Eligibility for an Equitable Remedy

It is well-established that there can be no equitable award of specific performance
without some showing that the plaintiffs' reliance on the oral promises of the defendant
resulted in substantial losses, and that damages would be inadequate to compensate their
loss. See Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 275-76 and cases cited therein. This is because the
doctrine of part performance is based on the equitable theory of estoppel and therefore detrimental reliance must be shown. Id. (quoting In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah
1954)). Plaintiffs acknowledge this requirement, but having acknowledged it, they have
failed to address it both in their evidence before the trial court and in their brief on appeal.
See Appellees' Br. at 28 (quoting Martin at 275). As previously explained, plaintiffs here
have proved no losses resulting from the purchase of their lots, which were priced based on
an appraisal of the land without water rights. R. 353-55; R. 674-75. Nor have plaintiffs

148961.4
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explained why damages would be inadequate to remedy any losses they might claim. See
Appellants' Br. at 35-37. The trial court's lengthy findings of fact are likewise silent on
this issue, and it is not addressed in the Judgment. This omission is fatal. Plaintiffs cannot
recover under the doctrine of part performance without some showing of substantial loss.
B.

Plaintiffs Have Utterly Failed to Show Any Act of Reliance Exclusively
Referable to the Oral Contracts They Allege

Even if the plaintiffs could show the kind of losses that would qualify them for the
equitable remedy they seek, they do not show that such losses were the result of acts of
reliance that can be explained only by reference to the oral contract they claim. In other
words, they cannot satisfy the requirement of "exclusive referability."
1.

Plaintiffs' Alleged Acts of Reliance Are Not Exclusively
Referable to Any Promise for Free Irrigation Water

Plaintiffs show no act of part performance done in reliance on their alleged oral
contracts that would not have been performed had the contracts not existed. The trial
court found that the plaintiffs had purchased their lots in reliance on the Warrs' alleged
promise that they would not be charged for Irrigation Water. However, the Warrs have
shown that the plaintiffs purchased lots pursuant to their written contracts, not in the
performance of unwritten agreements. See Appellants' Br. at 28. The Warrs also have
shown that many people, including plaintiffs Wayne and Miriam Lewis, have purchased
lots without any expectation of Irrigation Water. Plaintiffs do not and cannot deny that
the purchase of their lots can be explained without reference to the Irrigation Water. This
act is therefore insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute part performance in circumvention of the statute of frauds. See Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 278-79 (exclusive

148961.4

12

referability is a question of law); see also Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79-80
(Utah 1982); Baugh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah 1972).
In their brief, plaintiffs also assert that they improved their lots by building homes
and, in the case of three plaintiffs, a water distribution pipeline in reliance on oral contracts
with the Warrs for free Irrigation Water. See Appellees' Br. at 28. The trial court did not
find, nor could it reasonably have found, that these acts were done in reliance on the
alleged contract for free Irrigation Water; therefore plaintiffs' claims of reliance are
entitled to no deference.
Further, there are at least three reasons why plaintiffs' improvements cannot
establish part performance. First, the lot improvements were not required by the parties'
alleged agreement and therefore were not done in performance or part performance of the
alleged oral contracts. See Martin, 678 P.2d at 275 and sources cited therein. Second,
plaintiffs' improvements to the lots are not exclusively referable to the alleged contracts.
For instance, the homes plaintiffs built are not dependent on the Irrigation Water, but are
fully supplied with culinary water by on-lot wells, consistent with the general practice in
the area. R. 633, 667-74. The fact that all but one of the plaintiffs have built homes
without Irrigation Water and have comfortably occupied those homes for several years, see
R. 663, 667-74, suggests that this act was not dependent on an expectation of Irrigation
Water and therefore cannot be exclusively referable to the oral contracts plaintiffs allege.
Likewise, the plaintiffs' participation in the construction of the distribution pipeline is
equally consistent with the Warrs' understanding that the lot owners intended to purchase
Irrigation Water, and is not exclusively referable to the claimed contracts. Finally, the de
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minimus participation of the three plaintiffs who helped with construction of the water line
does not constitute "significant" reliance,5 and could not serve as part performance for the
other seven plaintiffs, even if it otherwise qualified as part performance.
Plaintiffs make no effort to show how any of their acts of alleged reliance are
exclusively referable to the alleged promise that they would be given Irrigation Water free
of charge. Plaintiffs claim that they would not have purchased lots or built improvements
unless they believed they would be given free Irrigation Water with the lots, but there is
nothing about the plaintiffs' actions themselves that manifests any such understanding.6 As
this Court has explained, the doctrine of part performance is an "acts-oriented rather than a
word-oriented evidentiary requirement," and "equity declines to act on words . . . unless
the words are confirmed and illuminated by deeds." Martin, 678 P.2d at 275, 277. In this
case, the plaintiffs are long on after-the-fact words, but exceedingly short on any meaningful deeds.
2.

Plaintiffs Cannot Avoid the Requirement of Showing Acts
Exclusively Referable to the Oral Contracts They Allege

Because plaintiffs cannot show any act exclusively referable to the oral contracts
they allege, they seek to dispense with this requirement by arguing that it is "satisfied" by
independent evidence of the contract. Appellees' Br. at 29. Plaintiffs' argument misrepresents the law of part performance as set forth by this Court in Martin v. Scholh
"[WJhere either independent acts which prove the contract can be found, or an admission
5

The three plaintiffs who helped with the line have stipulated that their contributions
were $300 or $600 of the total cost, which was between $6,000 and $10,000. R. 668.
6
It is undisputed, of course, that the amount the plaintiffs paid for their lots was based on
an appraisal of the land without irrigation water. R. 353-55; R. 674-75. Thus, while
plaintiffs may claim they would never have purchased lots without the Irrigation Water, it
is clear that what they paid for was exactly that.
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of the contract is present, the requirement of exclusive referability may be relaxed." 678
P.2d at 278 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs cite this language, but overstate its effect by
claiming that their independent evidence "satisfied" the requirement of exclusive
referability. Appellees' Br. at 29. The Martin case demonstrates that the evidentiary
standard for part performance is more stringent than plaintiffs would have the Court
believe, and demands more compelling evidence than plaintiffs can provide.
In Martin, the trial court found that the claimants' independent evidence had shown
the existence of an oral contract. 678 P.2d at 278. The Utah Supreme Court did not
question this finding of fact, but nevertheless reversed the district court as a matter of law
because the acts of reliance urged by the plaintiff were not exclusively referable to the
alleged contract, but could be explained on other grounds. Id. at 279. This Court held that
"the necessity of showing acts of part performance which were exclusively referable to the
claimed agreement remain[ed] vital," in spite of the trial court's finding of oral contract,
because the evidence of the contract was not undisputed, i.e., "the evidence of the oral
contract. . . required the judge to weigh the credibility of Martin's witnesses against
witnesses for the [defendants] who vigorously disputed the existence of an oral contract."
Id. The trial court in the instant case found the existence of an oral contract by "beyond a
preponderance of the evidence," R. 921, but the Martin Court stated that the exclusive
referability requirement cannot be relaxed even where the trial court finds the existence of
the contract is proved by clear and convincing evidence. 678 P.2d at 280 n. 1.
The rule established by Martin is that the exclusive referability requirement may be
"relaxed where there [is] no evidentiary concern regarding the existence of a contract," but
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where the contract is disputed, as it is here, the requirement remains vital. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have shown no acts of reliance that can be explained only by reference to the oral contract they allege. Their claim of part performance must therefore fail.
Even where the oral contract is undisputed, the requirement of showing acts exclusively referable to the contract is not "satisfied," but merely "relaxed." In McDonald v.
Barton Bros. Investment Corp., Inc., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981), the defendant, a property
purchaser, admitted that he had entered into the oral agreement claimed by the seller, but
this agreement was not included by covenant in the written purchase agreement. Id. at 852.
The trial court held that the purchaser was bound under the doctrine of part performance,
but this Court reversed. The court stated:
The controlling issue on . . . appeal is not whether [the] oral contract was
proved by clear and convincing evidence,.. . but whether the alleged acts of
part performance were themselves referable to and done in pursuance of that
contract. If the acts relied on were not done in the execution of the oral
contract but can be explained on another ground, they are insufficient to
remove the bar of the statute of frauds, and the contract is unenforceable.
Id. at 853 (emphasis added). The Court reversed the trial court's finding of part
performance because the acts of alleged reliance were not exclusively referable to the parties' oral contract. Id. Plaintiffs in this case cannot avoid the requirement of demonstrating
acts exclusively referable to the oral contracts they allege. Their failure to do so means that
their alleged oral contracts are barred by the statute of frauds and are unenforceable.

7

A "relaxed" standard might require plaintiffs to show acts of part performance that are
"not readily explainable" or "not reasonably explicable" on some ground other than the
alleged oral contract. See Martin, 678 P.2d at 280. The acts of supposed reliance undertaken by the plaintiffs are readily explainable on the ground that the Warrs intended to sell
the Irrigation Water to the plaintiffs, and in fact provide no evidence whatever that the
water was to be given free of charge.
148961.4
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3.

Plaintiffs' "Independent Evidence" Is Not Compelling

Even if the requirement of exclusive referability could be "satisfied," the
independent evidence put forward by the plaintiffs falls far below the "high evidentiary
standard" required for the operation of the part performance doctrine in circumvention of
the statute of frauds. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d at 276 (citing Van Natta v. Heywood, 195
P. 192, 194 (Utah 1920)). As discussed in the Warrs' opening brief, the independent
evidence relied on by the trial court is equivocal at best. See Appellants' Br. at 29-35. It
shows only that the Warrs intended to develop the Irrigation Water for use on the Erda
Farm and in the Subdivision and documents the Warrs' efforts to accomplish this purpose.
Again, this is not disputed. The only dispute in this case is whether the Irrigation Water

Although the Warrs have not challenged the trial court's factual findings in this appeal,
the Warrs nevertheless take issue with the plaintiffs' characterization of the evidence in
their brief. For example, plaintiffs falsely claim that the Warrs filed a Change Application
in 1983 to change the place of use of the Irrigation Water to the Subdivision to facilitate
development of the Subdivision. Appellees' Br. at 5. However, the record shows that the
Warrs changed the place of use to the entire 110-acre Erda Farm, not just the Subdivision,
which was later located on a portion of the Farm. See R. 677; Tr. Ex. 3 (copy attached to
Appellants' Br. at App. G). The Subdivision was not even created until 1985, and the
Warrs had no intention of subdividing their property in 1983. R. 676; Tr. Ex. 15 (copy
attached to Appellants' Br. at App. F); R. 954 at 68. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, the
Warrs are not obliged under the terms of their Change Application or subsequent Applications for Extensions to use any portion of the Irrigation Water on the plaintiffs' lots.
Plaintiffs also quote Hazel Warr's testimony out of context to suggest unfairly that
she admitted to perjury while on the witness stand. Appellees' Br. at 12. Mrs. Warrs'
statement, "I suppose I'm perjured," was not, as plaintiffs' insinuate, an explanation of her
testimony, but a reaction to plaintiffs' counsel's mischaracterization of her Affidavit in the
Bleazard litigation. Counsel insisted that the Affidavit represented that the Irrigation Water
was sold with the lots. R. 954 at 95 (copy attached to Addendum as App C). Mrs. Wandisagreed, but admitted that, to the extent the Affidavit meant what plaintiffs' counsel said
it meant, her prior testimony in the Affidavit was false. Id. Read in context, however, Mrs.
Warr's testimony makes it clear that she did not understand the Affidavit this way when
she signed it, but understood it to say only that lot purchasers were told they would be
provided with Irrigation Water for their purchase. Id. at 95-97.
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was promised to lot purchasers free of charge. The only evidence of such promises is the
plaintiffs' own testimonies, which themselves were often inconclusive.9 At any rate, the
plaintiffs' self-serving testimonies are not the kind of "independent evidence" that can
satisfy the "high evidentiary standard" required to circumvent the statute of frauds.
C.

Hazel Warr Did Not Legally Authorize Anyone to Sell Her Interest in
the Irrigation Water

Plaintiffs argue that Hazel Warr promised them Irrigation Water, and that even if
she didn't, she should be bound under principles of agency or estoppel by the alleged
statements of her husband or her son. Appellees' Br. at 32. Plaintiffs' claims are
unsupported by the record or the law.
The record cited by plaintiffs in their brief shows that only three plaintiffs—Fred
Martinez, Karen Martinez, and Wayne Reynolds—even claim to have received promises
from Hazel. Appellees' Br. at 32 citing R. 953 at 79-80,195-96; R. 954 at 6-9, 27, 45-46,
50. Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence from the record that Hazel ever promised to
provide free Irrigation Water to the other seven plaintiffs with their lots. Id.10
Because they can find no evidence that Hazel Warr ever promised free Irrigation
Water to the remaining plaintiffs, plaintiffs claim in the alternative that Hazel Warr is liable
under the principles of agency and estoppel for promises allegedly made by Edward Warr
or by the Warrs' estranged son, Howard Warr. Appellees' Br. at 33-35. Plaintiffs cite no
9

For example, Clifford Ruben testified: "We just thought the water came with the deed
itself." Q: "Is that what you were told?" A: "No, we just assumed that." R. 953 at 120
(emphasis added). Loralee Crittenden likewise testified: "They never did say a price or
anything at that time. That's why we made an assumption that water went with it." R.
954 at 22 (emphasis added).
10
Plaintiffs cite the testimony of Sandy Spears, but her testimony when questioned as to
who had promised her Irrigation Water was only: "You know, I'm not sure. I think it
was just in the conversation about the—I don't recall which one it was." R. 953 at 80.
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case law in support of these theories, but rely on provisions of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, §§8 and 8B. Whatever the general rules of agency and estoppel may be, the Utah
Legislature has made it clear, and this Court has expressly held, that where the underlying
transaction is one that must normally be reduced to writing under the statute of frauds, any
agent purporting to act on behalf of a seller must likewise be authorized in writing. Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-1; Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Utah 1982). Plaintiffs can
produce no writing authorizing either Edward Warr or Howard Warr to sell Hazel Warr's
interest in the Irrigation Water. Their claims of reliance on the alleged promises of these
persons are therefore incapable of conveying Hazel Warr's interest in the Irrigation Water.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court properly concluded that the statute of limitations

was tolled under the "misleading conduct" and "exceptional circumstances" exceptions
until the plaintiffs' discovery of their cause of action in late 1995. Appellees' Br. at 35.
The trial court reached no such conclusion, but held only that the plaintiffs had timely
brought their cause of action after the discovery of their claims. R. 955 at 148; R. 920.
Further, there is no evidence of any such misleading conduct or exceptional circumstances.
A.

Plaintiffs Do Not Support Their Claims from the Record

Although the trial court found no misleading conduct or exceptional circumstances
in this case, plaintiffs attempt to shore up the trial court's Judgment by alleging it in their
brief. See Appellees' Br. at 36-38. However, the plaintiffs' allegations are unsupported by
any citation to the record, as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) & (e). Id. The Court
therefore has no obligation to address these allegations and may rule as a matter of law that
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the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See MacKay v. Hardy, 973
P.2d 941, 948 n.9 (Utah 1998) and cases cited therein.
B.

Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Facts Sufficient to Toll the Statute

But even if the Court should decide to address plaintiffs' claims of misleading conduct or exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs' assertions are insufficient to justify a tolling
of the statute of limitations under these exceptions because they do not show (i) that plaintiffs exercised due diligence to discover their cause of action within the statutory period,
(ii) that the Warrs undertook any affirmative acts of concealment, or (iii) that application of
the statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust in the present circumstances.
1.

Plaintiffs Failed to Exercise Due Diligence

As a pre-requisite to a tolling of the statute of limitations under either the misleading
conduct or the exceptional circumstances versions of the discovery rule, plaintiffs must
show that, by exercise of "due diligence," they "could not reasonably have discovered the
facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within" the statutory
limitations period. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 52, 55 (Utah 1996) (citations
omitted). Plaintiffs made no effort to discover their claims within the statutory period.
Plaintiffs allege no facts that would have prevented them from examining their deeds
within the statutory period and determining that the Irrigation Water was neither conveyed
nor promised in the deeds. "[Djiligence involves a duty on the part of both parties to make
certain that their agreements have in fact been fully included in the final document." Secor,
716 P.2d at 794 (emphasis added). If the plaintiffs truly believed that they were promised
Irrigation Water with the purchase of their lots, it was their duty to exercise at least this
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minimal degree of diligence.
2.

Plaintiffs Allege No Affirmative Acts of Concealment

Plaintiffs argue that they did not discover their cause of action until 1995 because of
the Warrs' "misleading conduct," Appellees' Br. at 35-37, but they allege no act on the part
of the Warrs that would suffice to toll the statute of limitations under the fraudulent
concealment exception. In order to invoke this exception, plaintiffs must "allege[ ] and
make[ ] out a prima facie case that a defendant has taken affirmative steps to conceal the
plaintiffs' cause of action." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added). Even plaintiffs'
unsupported assertions do not show any action by the Warrs that could reasonably mislead
the plaintiffs or conceal the facts on which their action is based.
The only misleading conduct plaintiffs allege was that the Warrs told them that they
intended to provide the water "as soon as delivery became possible," that "the water could
not yet be delivered because of the pending litigation with Bleazard and various problems
with the pipeline," and that "deeds were being prepared." Appellees' Br. at 36. Each of
these supposedly "misleading statements" was actually true, and each one has been
stipulated to by the parties. See R. 680 (Warrs intended to provide the Irrigation Water for
sale to lot owners if and when it became available); R. 665 (Warrs provided plaintiffs with
opportunity to purchase Irrigation Water after title was secured and delivery became
possible); R. 677, 668 (capacity of Railroad Pipeline is inadequate to deliver Irrigation
Water); R. 673, 667 (Bleazard prevented conveyance of water until 1993); R. 665 (Warrs
prepared quit-claim deeds in 1993 for sale of Irrigation Water). Further, there is nothing
about any of these statements that could reasonably mislead the plaintiffs into thinking that
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the Irrigation Water would be given to them free of charge.
Other than these admittedly true statements, plaintiffs allege as misleading conduct
only that "the Warrs never indicated to the Plaintiffs t h a t . . . the Plaintiffs would be
charged an additional fee for the water." Appellees' Br. at 37. There is nothing misleading
about the Warrs' silence on this point, since there is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs
ever asked the Warrs, either before or after the sale of the lots, whether they would be
charged for Irrigation Water. The Warrs' silence under these circumstances cannot be
construed as the taking of "affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs' cause of action."
Berenda, 914 ?.2d at 50.
3.

Plaintiffs Do Not Show Any Exceptional Circumstance

Under the exceptional circumstances exception, plaintiffs must show "that the
application of the statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust." Burkholz v. Joyce,
972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998). To determine this, the Court "will apply a balancing test
to weigh 'the hardship imposed on the claimant by the application of the statute of
limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time.'"
Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,1f 11, 998 P.2d 262 (citations omitted). The factors the Court
will consider in this balancing test include: "whether the defendant's problems caused by
the passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs . . . and whether the claim has aged to the
point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot
remember basic events." Sevy v. Security Title, 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). In this
case the balance favors the Warrs.
The only hardship plaintiffs claim is that they would lose their case against the
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Warrs if the statute of limitations is applied. Appellees5 Br. at 39. But this is the result in
every instance where the statute of limitations is applied, and is not the kind of "exceptional circumstance" that requires the statute to be tolled. The Warrs, on the other hand, have
suffered severe prejudice as a result of plaintiffs' delay in bringing their cause of action.
Edward Warr, who was the person principally involved in the sale of the lots, R. 73, suffered the onslaught of heart disease and diabetes in the years subsequent to the sale of these
lots, and underwent a quadruple bypass heart surgery prior to the trial of this case. R. 689;
R. 954 at 138, 149. In December of 2000, Mr. Warr passed away as a result of his illness.
Mr. Warr's illness and old age affected his memory and prevented him from effectively
testifying in his own defense during the trial. R. 954 at 138, 145-49. The trial court
acknowledged that Edward Warr's testimony was unreliable because of his physical
condition, and ultimately disregarded his testimony in its entirety. R. 954 at 150. It should
be obvious that the defense is prejudiced where the testimony of its principal witness is
disregarded by the court. Because the prejudice to the Warrs caused by plaintiffs' delay
outweighs the harm to plaintiffs, the "exceptional circumstances" exception is inapplicable
in this case and plaintiffs' claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
IV,

THE LEWISES LACK THE PRIVITY OF CONTRACT NECESSARY FOR
THEM TO BRING AN ACTION AGAINST THE WARRS
Plaintiffs do not address any of the privity arguments asserted by the Warrs in their

opening brief, except to state, in a conclusory fashion, that by virtue of the quit claim deed,
"the [Crittendons'] claim for the water rights is now vested in the Lewises, and they are
entitled to the irrigation water." Appellees' Br. at 39-40. However, there is no legal basis
for the Lewises' claim, which is barred both by their lack of privity with the Warrs and by
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their failure to set forth this subsequent transaction in a supplemental pleading. See
Appellants' Br. at 41-44.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REQUIRES THE WARRS TO
CONVEY AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WATER
In an attempt to increase their already unfair taking of the Warrs' Irrigation Water,

plaintiffs claim that they are each entitled to a deed granting them .079 cfs of water. Appellees' Br. at 40. Plaintiffs ignore the fact that the Rose Spring is subject to seasonal fluctuations and drought conditions. The amount of water actually available to the Warrs from
the flow of Rose Spring is probably insufficient to supply .079 cfs, and the Warrs' water
right is limited to a percentage of that flow. See Appellants' Br. at 44-45. Plaintiffs simply
claim, without citation to the record, that "[t]he record plainly established that the Plaintiffs
were promised sufficient water to irrigate five acres,"11 and that .079 cfs is required for this
purpose. Appellees' Br. at 40. However, the record actually shows that plaintiffs can
claim no more than 7.5% of the Warrs' water right, up to a maximum of .075 cfs.
Plaintiffs do not deny that .075 cfs of water is sufficient to irrigate 4.5 acres, and do
not claim that any more than 4.5 acres of their lots is irrigible land. See id. Plaintiffs cite
testimony of Vern Loveless indicating that .079 cfs would irrigate their lots, and attach the
quit-claim deeds prepared by Mr. Loveless in 1993 for that amount. Id. at 40, Supp. App.
at "A." However, plaintiffs omit the portion of Mr. Loveless' testimony explaining how he
corrected those deeds the following year after determining that .079 cfs could not reasonably be used on the plaintiffs' lots and prepared new quit-claim deeds for 7.5% of the
11

Appellants' examination of the record on this point revealed only the testimony of
Melvin Spears, who testified that the Warrs never told him how much irrigation water
would be conveyed. R. 953 at 42.
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Irrigation Water, up to a maximum of .075 cfs. See R. 954 at 185 (copy attached to
Addendum as App. D); R. 954 at 185-86; Tr. Exs. 90, 92, 97, 98.
The plaintiffs uniformly testified that they were never presented with quit-claim
deeds until late 1995, by which time the 1993 deeds had indisputably been replaced by
deeds conveying 7.5% of the Irrigation Water. R. 593 at 58-59, 101-102, 182-83, 204-05;
R. 954 at 53. Every lot owner who acquired Irrigation Water from the Warrs was conveyed
7.5%. R. 665-67; Tr. Exs. 97, 98, 108. This was also the amount prayed for in the plaintiffs' own Complaint, R. 34, and although he expressed some confusion as to what the
actual percentage should be, Judge Young specifically ruled from the bench that the Warrs
were to convey a percentage of their water sufficient to irrigate 4.5 acres of the plaintiffs'
lots. See R. 955 at 145, 149-50. The Court should not countenance plaintiffs' avaricious
and overreaching attempt to take more water than they can even use, and potentially more
than the Warrs own. Any quit-claim deeds executed on behalf of plaintiffs should be
limited to 7.5% of the Warrs' original water right.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand this case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Warrs.

The Complaint actually indicates that each plaintiffs "respective share" is "7.5 cfs."
R. 34. This is of course is many times more water than the entire Rose Spring contains.
Plaintiffs presumably mean 7.5 percent.
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Tab A

LEXSEE987p.2d30
J. Rodney Dansie, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association, a Utah non-profit corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 970517
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
1999 UT 62; 987P.2d 30; 1999 Utah LEXIS 98; 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 6
June 22,1999, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
[***1] Rehearing Denied October 6, 1999. Released for
Publication October 22, 1999.
PRIOR HISTORY:
Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable Pat B.
Brian.

COUNSEL:
George A. Hunt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

[*P2] Dansie owns two forty-acre parcels of real
property (collectively the "Property") located in
southwest Salt Lake County, Utah. These parcels abut
the Subdivision to the south and west; specifically, these
parcels are described as the southwest quarter [***2] of
the southwest quarter (the "westerly parcel") and the
southeast quarter of the southwest quarter (the "easterly
parcel") of section 5, township 4 south, range 2 west,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Dansie also owns two lots
within the Subdivision—lots 43 and 51.
[*P3]

A. Howard Lundgren, Sheleigh A. Chalkley, Salt Lake
City, for defendant.
JUDGES:
HOWE, Chief Justice. Associate Chief Justice Durham,
Justice Stewart, Justice Zimmerman, and Justice Russon
concur in Chief Justice Howe's opinion.
OPINIONBY:
HOWE
OPINION:
[**31] HOWE, Chief Justice:
[*P1] Plaintiff J. Rodney Dansie appeals from a
judgment in this declaratory judgment action that his
eighty acres of real property were subject to the
covenants, conditions, and restrictions which had been
imposed on an adjacent subdivision, the Hi-Country
Estates Phase I Subdivision (the "Subdivision" or "Phase
I"), and that his property was subject to assessments
made by the defendant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Association (the "Association").

BACKGROUND

In 1970, Gerald H. Bagley, Charles Lewton, and
Keith Spencer (the "developers") began to develop the
Subdivision. At that time, they recorded a "Declaration
of Protective Covenants" for the Subdivision. Soon
afterwards, Dansie became aware of the planned Phase I
development following the erection of a sign announcing
the Subdivision's development. Dansie then met the
developers in connection with negotiations for an
agreement between them and Dansie's father to provide
water to the Subdivision. Dansie also reviewed a sales
brochure which indicated lot sizes and prices and
described the Subdivision as a private community,
accessible through an electronic gate. In early 1973,
Lewton organized the Association, a Utah non-profit
corporation, and filed a certificate of incorporation.
According to the certificate of incorporation, the purpose
of the Association was to provide for maintenance,
upkeep and preservation of the [***3] streets, roads and
common area within [the Subdivision] and also to ...
promote the health, safety and welfare of the residents
within [the Subdivision] and any additions thereto as
may hereafter be brought within the jurisdiction of this
Association....
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1999UT62,*;987P.2d30, **;
1999 Utah LEXIS 98, ***; 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 6
[**32] P4 In December 1973, Lewton and an entity
described as "Hi-Country Estates Second" sold to
Bagley, under a written contract, five forty-acre parcels
of land adjacent to the Subdivision that included the
Property. In this real estate contract (the "1973
Contract"), Bagley received the right to use the
Association's roads in the Subdivision for access to the
property he was purchasing. In return, Bagley would
become a member of the Association and pay a
proportionate share of the costs of road maintenance and
other services. Although the 1973 Contract's terms
specifically bound Bagley's assigns and successors, it
was not recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office.
[*P5]
In 1977, Bagley hired Dansie as a contractor to
assist with the development and maintenance of the
Subdivision's water system, by digging water lines,
making connections, and repairing pumps. Acting in that
capacity, Dansie aided in the placement and [***4]
installation of a 40,000-gallon water tank on the westerly
parcel in 1978.
[*P6] Dansie acquired lots 51 and 43 within the
Subdivision in 1984 and 1985, respectively. In
November 1985, Bagley conveyed the westerly parcel to
Dansie by warranty deed. Prior to that conveyance,
however, Bagley had executed a trust deed in favor of
United Bank, whose successor foreclosed on the westerly
parcel in February 1989 (the "foreclosure") and later sold
it to Fidelity National Insurance Company. With Dansie's
aid, his in-laws, Paul G. and Ida F. Evans (the
"Evanses"), purchased the westerly parcel at a public sale
in March 1989. The Evanses ultimately conveyed the
westerly parcel to Dansie in 1993 as part of a divorce
settlement between Dansie and their daughter. In 1989,
Bagley's attorney, Ralph Marsh, conveyed the easterly
parcel to Dansie. None of the aforementioned deeds to
the Property made any reference to any covenants,
conditions, or restrictions on the property, nor did any
appear in the Property's chain of title.
[*P7]
In 1986, prior to the foreclosure, Dansie conveyed
the westerly parcel and lot 43 in the Subdivision to
himself and his wife by a quit-claim deed to create a joint
tenancy [***5] in the parcels. This quit-claim deed
describes the property conveyed as:
PARCEL ONE:
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 5, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
PARCEL TWO:

ALL OF Lot 43, HI-COUNTRY ESTATES,
according to the official plat thereof on file in the Office
of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah.
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way over and across
and [sic] the private roads located within said
subdivision.
SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, and
restrictions on HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, as recorded in
Book 3541, Page 68, Entry No. 2607748, Official
Records, and the Rules and Regulations of the HICOUNTRY ESTATES Homeowner's Association.
ALSO SUBJECT TO restrictions, rights of way, and
easements appearing of record or enforceable in law and
equity.
[*P8]
In 1990, the Association began sending the Evanses
assessment notices for the westerly parcel. Dansie acted
as their agent and attempted to ascertain the reason for
the Association's attempted collection of assessments on
a parcel outside the boundaries of the Subdivision. While
the Association had previously assessed Dansie for lots
43 and 51 in the Subdivision, and while he [***6] was
aware of the specific breakdown of the Association's
assessments, he had not received assessment notices on
the westerly parcel at any time he had owned the parcel
prior to the foreclosure. In November 1991, BackmanStewart Title Services, Ltd., paid the "1991 Association
assessment, gate repair fee plus interest, penalties and
fees" on Dansie's behalf, although the payment was made
under Dansie's protest.
[*P9] The Association continued in its attempts to
collect fees and assessments on the Property from
Dansie. In response to these repeated attempts, Dansie
filed this declaratory judgment action against the
Association, seeking a determination that he was entitled
to an easement either by prescription and/or implication
across the roads of the Subdivision, [**33] and that the
Subdivision's covenants, conditions and restrictions
("CC&Rs") and the Subdivision's "right to make such
assessments [pursuant to the CC&RS] is limited as a
matter of law against property located within the
physical boundaries" of the Subdivision and not against
the Property. The Association counterclaimed, seeking a
judgment against Dansie for all unpaid assessments,
interest on the assessments, and attorney [***7] fees,
alleging that under the 1973 Contract, Dansie was a
member of the Association and was therefore subject to
the Subdivision's CC&Rs and was also subject to all
corresponding fees and assessments.
[*P10] At trial, the court dismissed with prejudice
Dansie's claim for a prescriptive easement and for
declaratory relief. Also, the court declared Dansie's claim
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for an implied easement "effectively mooted by the
judgment." On the counterclaim, the trial court
determined: (1) The quit-claim deed unambiguously
imposed both the Association's CC&Rs on the westerly
parcel and Association membership on Dansie; (2) Both
parcels were subject to the Association's CC&Rs by
virtue of Dansie's actual notice of the CC&Rs; and (3)
Dansie was thereby bound to pay all assessments and
fees as required by Association membership. The court
awarded the Association judgment for all past
assessments and fees, including interest and attorney
fees. Dansie now appeals.
ANALYSIS
[*P11] Dansie assigns as error the trial court's
conclusions that (1) the quit-claim deed subjected the
westerly parcel to the CC&Rs and imposed Association
membership on Dansie; (2) Dansie had knowledge,
either constructive or actual, [***8] of the CC&Rs,
which subjected the Property to them even though they
were not in the chain of title to the Property; and (3) the
Association's by-laws (the "By-laws") required Dansie to
pay the Association's attorney fees in this action.
I. THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED
[*P12] Dansie contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that the quit-claim deed subjected the
westerly parcel to the Subdivision's CC&Rs that had
been imposed earlier on the Subdivision. As set out
above, the deed conveyed two parcels of land. Parcel
One was the westerly parcel. Parcel Two was lot 43, HICOUNTRY ESTATES, a lot in the Subdivision.
Following the description of lot 43, there were three
qualifying paragraphs as follows:
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way over and across and
[sic] the private roads located within said subdivision.
SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, and restrictions on
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, as recorded in Book 3541,
Page 68, Entry No. 2607748, Official Records, and the
Rules and Regulations of the HI-COUNTRY ESTATES
Homeowner's Association.
ALSO SUBJECT TO restrictions, rights-of-way, and
easements appearing of record or enforceable in law and
equity.
[*P13]
The Association correctly [***9]
characterizes the three qualifying paragraphs as the
habendum clause of the deed whose purpose is to curtail,
limit, or qualify the estate conveyed in the granting
clause. See Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 353, 85 P.2d
861 (1939). However, the issue in the instant case is
whether this habendum clause qualifies both parcels or

only Parcel Two. The trial court interpreted the
"SUBJECT TO" and the "ALSO SUBJECT TO"
paragraphs to apply to both Parcels One and Two. This
was error for the following reasons.
[*P14] First, the drafter of the deed clearly
intended to deal with the two parcels separately as
evidenced by labeling them "Parcel One" and "Parcel
Two." All three of the qualifying paragraphs appear
under the heading "PARCEL TWO," clearly indicating
that they apply only to lot 43. They do not appear under
the heading "PARCEL ONE." From the date of the
Subdivision's creation, lot 43 was subject to the CC&Rs.
Every succeeding conveyance of a Subdivision lot would
have properly indicated that the lot was subject to the
CC&Rs. However, Parcel One had not theretofore been
subjected to the CC&Rs because it lay outside the
Subdivision. The "Declaration of Protective Covenants"
referred to [***10] in the deed expressly imposed the
CC&Rs only on the Subdivision. [**34] We should not
lightly assume that they could be also imposed on
adjoining property such as Parcel One without a clear
expression of intent by the owner to do so. That was not
done here. "Restrictive covenants are not favored in the
law and are strictly construed in favor of the free and
unrestricted use of property." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v.
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991)
(citing Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah
1982); Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 345, 423 P.2d
155, 159 (1967); Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419,
421, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959)).
[*P15]
Second, if we determine that the
"SUBJECT TO" and the "ALSO SUBJECT TO"
paragraphs apply to Parcel One as the trial court did, then
by the same reasoning we must conclude that the
preceding qualifying paragraph reading "TOGETHER
WITH a right of way over and across and [sic] the
private roads located within said subdivision" must also
apply to Parcel One. That reading would obviously be
erroneous because it would amount to Dansie unilaterally
granting to himself and his wife a right-of-way over the
Subdivision's roads for [***H] the benefit of Parcel
One without the consent of the Association that owned
the roads. A right-of-way cannot be created in that
manner.
[*P16] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
trial court's conclusion that the quit-claim deed imposed
the CC&Rs on the westerly parcel.
II. ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF
THE CC&Rs
A. Notice
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[*P17] Dansie next assigns as error the trial court's
conclusion that the Property was subject to the
Subdivision's CC&Rs because of Dansie's actual and
constructive notice that it had been the Subdivision's
developers' intention to impose the CC&Rs on any
additional phases of the Subdivision, including the
Property adjoining the Subdivision. The Association
relies largely upon the 1973 Contract. In that contract,
Bagley received the right to use the Association's roads
in the Subdivision for access to the property he was
purchasing. In return, the contract required Bagley to
become a member of the Association and pay a
proportionate share of the costs for road maintenance and
other services.
[*P18] The Association concedes that there is no
document that specifically imposes the CC&Rs on the
Property. The "Declaration of Protective Covenants,"
recorded [***12] in 1970 by the developers, specifically
imposed the CC&Rs only on the Subdivision. While it
may well have been the intent of the developers to
impose the covenants on additional phases of the
Subdivision which might be developed later, that was
never done by a written instrument. Moreover, even if
Dansie had notice or even knowledge of the developers'
intent and knew of the obligation to subject the Property
to the CC&Rs that the 1973 Contract imposed upon
Bagley, Dansie was not a party to that contract, nor is it
contended that he is a successor or assign of that contract
so as to be bound by its terms. The Association cites no
legal authority that would obligate Dansie to burden the
Property with the CC&Rs simply because he had notice
of the intent of the original developers and knowledge of
the 1973 Contract. In neither of the deeds by which
Dansie acquired title to the Property was there any
attempt to burden the Property with the CC&Rs. Dansie
acquired the Property free of all covenants, conditions,
and restrictions. He cannot be bound by the intent of
prior owners to subject the Property to the CC&Rs.
B. Merger
[*P19] There is an additional reason why the
Property is not burdened [***13]
by either a
membership requirement or the associated CC&Rs.
Dansie contends that even assuming the 1973 Contract
did impose the CC&Rs, "the contract terms merged into
subsequent deeds conveying the property and were
therefore extinguished as a matter of law." The generally
accepted rule dealing with merger supports Dansie's
position "that on delivery and acceptance of a deed the
provisions of the underlying contract for the conveyance
are deemed extinguished or superseded by the deed."
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986)
(citations omitted). [**35] However, the Association
correctly points out that there are exceptions to the
application of merger. We agree that exceptions to this

doctrine exist, "including fraud, mistake, and the
existence of collateral rights in the contract of sale."
Secor, 716 P. 2d at 793. The Association argues that the
collateral rights exception applies in this case. We
disagree with this argument.
[*P20] If the original contract requires the seller to
perform an act considered to be collateral to the
conveyance of title, those obligations are not
extinguished but instead survive the deed. Stubbs v.
Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977). In [***14]
Stubbs, this court indicated that a determination of
whether contract terms were either collateral or part of
the obligation to convey title depended to a great extent
on the intent of the parties. Id. There, we examined
contract terms allowing a vendor to remove certain
equipment and personal property from a building at a
time after delivery of the deed. We determined that these
contract terms were, in fact, collateral, stating;
When seller's performance is intended by the parties to
take place at some time after the delivery of the deed it
cannot be said that it was contemplated by the parties
that delivery of the deed would constitute full
performance on the part of the seller, absent some
manifest intent to the contrary.
Id. at 169-70. The Association argues that under Stubbs
the language of the 1973 Contract is not extinguished by
the later deeds because the "1973 Contract requires the
buyers to become members of the Homeowners
Association at some point after the signing of the
Contract ..., it contemplates performance after the
delivery of the deed, and constitutes a collateral
agreement."
[*P21] However, nearly a decade after Stubbs, this
[***15] court clarified the collateral rights standard,
holding that "covenants relating to title and
encumbrances are not considered to be collateral because
they relate to the same subject matter as does the deed."
Secor, 716P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted).
The contract language relied on by the Association here
is clearly a "covenant[] related to title and [an]
encumbrance[]" upon the title to the Property. The
CC&Rs burden the title. The 1973 Contract's language
clearly intends membership in the /* 'v3"^' ;\ o be
required simultaneously with the pa^n^ o- ; ue u the
Property. A duty to pay maintenance fees and other
monetary assessments and to comply with the
Subdivision's CC&Rs are fundamental elements of
Association membership. Therefore, ii cf. < T said
that this duty exists collateral to the title or d v. does
not "relate to the same subject matter as does the deed."
Id. Without express language imposing the membership
requirement in the later deeds, the requirement in the
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contract merged with the later deeds, and has thereby
been extinguished.
[*P22] In sum, Dansie's actual or constructive
notice of the intent of his predecessor in title does
[***16] not impose Association membership on him or
the Subdivision's CC&Rs on the Property.
III. IMPLIED EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
[*P23] In the alternative, the Association contends
that we can affirm the trial court's judgment under the
theory of implied equitable servitude. The Association
relies on a Maine case holding that an implied equitable
servitude may be imposed where the evidence
establishes:
(1) a common owner subdivides property into a
number of lots for sale; (2) the common owner has a
"general scheme of development" for the property as a
whole, in which the use of the property will be restricted;
(3) the vast majority of subdivided lots contain restrictive
covenants which reflect the general scheme; (4) the
property against which application of an implied
covenant is sought is part of the general scheme of
development; and (5) the purchaser of the lot in question
has notice, actual or constructive, of the restriction.
3 W Partners v. Bridges, 651 A.2d 387, 389 (Me. 1994)
(emphasis added) (quoting Chase v. Burrell, 474 A. 2d
180, 181 (Me. 1984)).
[*P24] It is readily apparent that even the first 3W
Partners' requirement cannot be [**36] met. The
Property has never been [***17J subdivided nor offered
for sale as individual lots. In Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah
54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946), we imposed a building
restriction on the defendant's lot where the restriction
appeared in ninety-five percent of the deeds to the
subdivision's lots. There, the defendant had notice of the
restriction that appeared in his chain of title. The instant
case presents a far different fact situation.
[*P25]
It is a long-standing, well-accepted
requirement that covenants are to be embodied in a
written instrument bearing the covenantor's signature.
See 9 Richard R. Powell on Real Property § 60.03
(1998). Admittedly, there are certain instances where
covenants can be imposed by implication, such as "from
the language of a deed or lease or from the conduct of
the parties." St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 198
(citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions § 173 (1965)). Those instances, however,
are extreme, and, "as a general rule, ... not favored in the

law." Id. (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d § 12; Brown v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 359, 617 P.2d 704 (1980)). For
such a covenant to be impliedly imposed on property,
"the support for [***18]
it must be 'plain and
unmistakable' or it must be 'necessary' as a matter of
law." Id. (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d § 173).
[*P26] In the instant case, the Subdivision's
developers placed the CC&Rs by written instrument on
Phase I alone. The developers' written, signed, and
recorded Protective Covenants expressly limit their
application to "the described property," which is Phase I.
Furthermore, while the Association's certificate of
incorporation refers to "any additional property] as may
hereafter be brought within the jurisdiction of the
Association," the Property has never either been part of
Phase I or been brought under the Association's purview.
Therefore, if Association membership—with its
corresponding fees, assessments, and CC&Rs-as is
currently imposed upon Phase I lot owners is to be
impliedly imposed upon the Property, it must be done in
plain and unmistakable language. That has not been done
here; thus, the Association's theory of implied equitable
servitudes is not applicable here.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES
[*P27]
The By-laws, after setting forth the
assessments for which each member is responsible,
dictate:
If the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days
after the [***19] due date, ... the Association may bring
an action at law against the owner personally obligated to
pay the same or foreclose the lien against the property,
and interest, costs, and reasonable attorney[] fees of any
such action shall be added to the amount of such
assessment.
[*P28] As we have found that the Property is not
subject to Association membership, the Association
cannot recover from Dansie the attorney fees the Bylaws impose. While Dansie is a member of the
Association by virtue of his ownership of two lots within
the Subdivision, that cannot make him liable for attorney
fees arising from a suit involving property outside of the
Association's purview.
[*P29] The judgment below is reversed and the
case is remanded for determination of Dansie's claim of
an easement across the Association's property.
Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart,
Justice Zimmerman, and Justice Russon concur in Chief
Justice Howe's opinion.
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Rodney MARTIN, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Bernice SCHOLL, Executrix of George H.
Chaffin Estate, and George H. Chaffin
Investment Company, a Utah limited
partnership, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 17542.
Supreme Court of Utah.

to convey 120 acres of land to laborer sufficient to take contract out of statute of
frauds where those acts were consonant
with laborer's employment.
Arthur H. Nielsen, Clark R. Nielsen,
John D. Russell, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Gordon L. Roberts, Raymond J. Etcheverry, Kent 0. Roche, Salt Lake City, Dave
McMullin, Payson, for plaintiff and respondent.

Nov. 14, 1983.
HOWE, Justice:
Ranch laborer brought action for specific performance of oral contract for conveyance of 120 acres of land. The Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Allen B. Sorensen, J., entered judgment for laborer,
and appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, Howe, J., held that ranch laborer's
working long, hard hours for owner and
declining other and better offers of employment elsewhere did not constitute exclusively referable acts of reliance on owner's
alleged oral agreement to convey 120 acres
of land to laborer sufficient to take contract out of statute of frauds where those
acts were consonant with laborer's employment.
Reversed.
Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion
in which Durham, J., concurred.
1. Frauds, Statute of <£=>129(1)
Ordinarily verbal gift of land or oral
agreement to convey land is within statute
of frauds; however, doctrine of part performance allows court of equity to enforce
oral agreement if it has been partially performed, notwithstanding statute. U.C.A.
1953, 25-5-8.
2. Frauds, Statute of <e=>129(12)
Ranch laborer's working long, hard
hours for owner and declining other and
better offers of employment elsewhere did
not constitute exclusively referable acts of
reliance on owner's alleged oral agreement

Defendant George H. Chaffin Investment Company, a limited partnership,
seeks reversal of a decree granting plaintiff Rodney Martin specific performance of
an oral contract which the trial court found
that the deceased George H. Chaffin had
made to convey or devise to him certain
real property in Genola, Utah County.
Martin began working as a ranch laborer
for Chaffin in 1936. He became foreman
over all of Chaffin's farm and ranch properties in 1947 and continued in that capacity beyond Chaffin's death to January of
1976. The Investment Company disputed
but the trial court found that Chaffin in
1947 had orally agreed to convey to Martin
120 acres of land referred to as "the home
place" if Martin would continue working as
his foreman. Martin remained, receiving a
salary and occasional raises. The trial
court determined that he labored long and
unusual hours and, with his wife, rendered
personal services to Chaffin in reliance
upon the contract. In 1968 Chaffin formed
the Investment Company as part of his
estate plan and conveyed certain real property to it, including the 120 acre ranch.
The trial court found that Martin had no
notice of the conveyance and, further, that
a gift of an interest in the Investment
Company which Chaffin had made to Martin in 1969 was for his faithful service,
unrelated to the 1947 agreement. The trial
court held that Chaffin had breached the
oral agreement when he died in 1975 without having conveyed or devised the ranch
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to Martin.
Consequently Martin was
granted a decree of specific performance
against the Investment Company which, as
a constructive trustee, held the ranch for
him. No cause of action was found against
the executrix of the Chaffin estate.
Our standard of review was stated in
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6
Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (1956):
In an equity review of facts if the record
shows a fair preponderance, or even if
the evidence is balanced evenly, the trial
court finding should be sustained. If the
evidence is so vague and uncertain that
the finding is obviously erroneous, there
may be a new finding on review.
[1] Ordinarily a verbal gift of land or
an oral agreement to convey land is within
the statute of frauds. However, the doctrine of part performance allows a court of
equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it
has been partially performed, notwithstanding the statute. U.C.A., 1953, § 255-8 of the Utah Statute of Frauds provides:
Nothing in this chapter contained shall
be construed to abridge the powers of
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.
In the context of an elderly aunt's promise to devise property to her nephew, this
Court outlined our standard of sufficient
part performance:
First, the oral contract and its terms
must be clear and definite; second, the
acts done in performance of the contract
must be equally clear and definite; and
third, the acts must be in reliance on the
contract. Such acts in reliance must be
such that a) they would not have been
performed had the contract not existed,
and b) the failure to perform on the part
of the promisor would result in fraud on
the performer who relied, since damages
would be inadequate. Reliance may be
made in innumerable ways, all of which
could refer exclusively to the contract.
This reliance provision is included to prevent unfounded and fraudulent claims
against a decedent's estate, which are
inherent within such situations as this.

Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust Company, supra, at 24, 305 P.2d at 484. In that
case we held that the nephew's change of
residence from Ogden to Provo in order to
live near his aunt, to care for her and to
manage her affairs met that standard.
Professor Corbin states a similar standard:
(1) The performance must be in pursuance of the contract and in reasonable
reliance thereon . . . (2) The performance
must be such that the remedy of restitution is not reasonably adequate . . . (3)
The performance must be one that is in
some degree evidential of the existence
of a contract and not readily explainable
on any other ground.
2 Corbin on Contracts, § 425 (1950). Another statement of the rule explains:
Part performance to be sufficient to take
a case out of the statute must consist of
clear, definite, and unequivocal acts of
the party relying thereon, strictly referable to the contract, and of such character
that it is impossible or impracticable to
place the parties in status quo, mere
nonaction being insufficient.
37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds, § 250 (1943).
The critical observation to make in reading these delineations of what constitutes
sufficient part performance is that it must
be proved by strong evidence. Whether
phrased in "reliance" terminology where
the evidentiary measurement is a substantial change in position or worded in "performance" language where the measurement is whether the acts appear to be a
result of the contract, or whether they are
explainable on another ground, the strong,
acts-oriented evidentiary standard is constant. This acts-oriented rather than wordoriented evidentiary requirement is consistent with one of the worthwhile functions of
the Statute of Frauds. It is:
[to impose] a high evidentiary standard
by which oral real estate contracts must
be proved to qualify for a specific performance. Equity has always demanded
more conclusive proof of a contract before granting its "most perfect remedy"
of specific performance . . .
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'The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah," 9
Utah Law Review 91, 105 (1971).
This Court in Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86,
86 P. 767 (1906), reversed a judgment
which had awarded land to a niece who had
performed personal services for the deceased and, with her husband, had moved
onto his property. The judgment was reversed because the niece's use of the land
and other acts for her uncle were insufficient evidence "that her status or relation
had been so far altered that not to enforce
a performance . . . inflict[ed] an unjust and
unconscionable . . . loss to her
She
[showed] no such strong equities . . . as . . .
are required to be shown independent of
the parol gift or verbal contract." Id. at
101, 86 P. at 772. Speaking of certain
improvements the niece made to the land,
this Court stated:
[W]e are of the opinion that the improvements are not of such value or character
as to take the case out of the operation
of the statute. Furthermore the evidence does not satisfy us with that clearness and persuasion required by the authorities that they were made in consequenc [sic] of a gift, or in pursuance of a
promise to convey, or that they are otherwise referable thereto. Indeed, there is
little or no direct evidence proving such
fact, nor is there any circumstance from
which it may be reasonably inferred . . .
[The improvements] . . . are as consistent
with some interest in the premises less
than a freehold as with an estate in freehold.
Price v. Lloyd, Id. at 98, 86 P. at 770.
This strong evidentiary standard had
been observed in Brinton v. Van Cott, 8
Utah 480, 33 P. 218 (1893). There, in reliance language, this Court held that the
defendant's failure to fulfill the contract
would work a fraud upon the rights of the
plaintiff since she gave up plans of future
independence to faithfully perform personal services of incalculable value for the
defendant. Although the young woman's
reliance was continued performance of service rather than a substantial change in

position, the evidentiary concern was satisfied since it was uncontested that the
young woman's sacrifice of plans of future
independence and continued service were a
result of an actual contract. Crucially significant was the fact that the existence of
the contract had been admitted as true.
Further:
The agreement was distinct and certain
as to what plaintiff should receive.
There was no vague, uncertain, undefined expectation of benefits to be derived, but a distinct positive promise,—
not to make plaintiff a gift, but in consideration of certain services, to bestow
upon her her entire property.
Id. at 486, 33 P. at 220. Consequently, in
Brinton, both equity and the statute of
frauds' purpose of verifying an actual
agreement were accomplished.
Similarly, this Court maintained a high
evidentiary standard in Van Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920). We
stated:
[T]his class of cases should be scrutinized with particular care; and unless
under the circumstances the proof is positive, clear, and convincing, the relief
sought should, and will, be denied.
Id. at 381, 195 P. at 194. Significantly, not
only many friends' and neighbors' testimony but independent evidence supported the
existence of an oral contract and the plaintiffs reliance upon it:
[T]he plaintiff accepted the offer of the
said Joseph McCullough [decedent], and
entered into possession of all the property of said estate, and at all times worked
for the said Joseph McCullough until his
death, without compensation, except
when plaintiff was drafted into the United States army, during which time the
said Joseph McCullough leased the property belonging to his said estate subject
to the condition that the said lease should
be canceled upon the discharge and return of the plaintiff herein from the
army; that upon the retirement of plaintiff from service in the army he returned
to the said Joseph McCullough, and
thereupon the lease was terminated, and
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plaintiff again went into possession of
the property of said estate, and continued to possess the same and care for and
remain with the said Joseph McCullough,
without compensation, until the death of
said McCullough . . .
Id. at 377, 195 P. at 192.
As we have suggested, the greatest value of the requirement of exclusively referable acts of reliance is its evidentiary significance.
[A]cts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in that
the possession of the party seeking specific performance and the improvements
made by him must be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract
exists [Citations omitted.] The reason
for such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is based
on estoppel and unless the acts of part
performance are exclusively referable to
the contract, there is nothing to show
that the plaintiff relied on it or changed
his position to his prejudice . . .
In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269
P.2d 278, 281 (1954).
In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260
P.2d 570 (1953), quoting from the earlier
Price v. Lloyd case, we remarked:
" . . . In order that a plaintiff may be
permitted to give evidence of a contract
not in writing, and which is in the very
teeth of the statute and a nullity at law,
it is essential that he establish [in equity], by clear and positive proof, acts and
things done in pursuance and on account
thereof, exclusively referable thereto,
and which take it out of the operation of
the statute."
Id. at 574, 260 P.2d at 578. In the next
paragraph we quoted Justice Cardozo:
"Equity . . . declines to act on words,
though the legal remedy is imperfect,
unless the words are confirmed and illuminated by deeds
"
Id. at 574, 260 P.2d at 578. The Ravarino
case involved an inter vivos transfer rather
than an instance of a promise to devise.
The statute of frauds remained a bar because the promisee did not acquire posses-

sion of the property and the purchase of a
strip of adjoining land was reasonably explainable on grounds other than the existence of an oral contract.
As recently as in McDonald v. Barton
Brothers Investment
Corp., Utah, 631
P.2d 851 (1981), another inter vivos transfer of land case, we reaffirmed the requirement of exclusively referable acts of reliance. We articulated:
If the acts relied on were not done in the
execution of the oral contract but can be
explained on another ground, they are
insufficient to remove the bar of the
statute of frauds and the contract is unenforceable.
Id. at 853. See also Coleman v. Dillman,
Utah, 624 P.2d 713 (1981);
Holmgren
Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, Utah, 534 P.2d
611 (1975). Cf. Jackson v. Jackson, 122
Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953) (where a
property settlement agreement was an insufficient memorandum of an oral contract
to remove the contract from the statute
and the promisee's raising of the children
was a term she had agreed to in the property settlement rather than an act exclusively
referable to the oral contract).
However, as the Brinton and Van Natta
cases allude, where the contract is admitted
or strong independent acts which prove the
contract exists, the requirement of exclusively referable acts has been relaxed.
Therefore, in the case of In re Roth's Estate, supra, we remanded with instructions
to grant specific performance because even
though it was possible to explain the taking
possession and making of improvements on
some other basis than that a contract existed, the promisor's own testimony established an oral agreement on his part to sell
his interest in the property to his brother.
We explained the rule:
[W]here the existence of the oral contract is established by an admission of
the party resisting specific performance
or by competent evidence independent of
the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts of part performance must be exclusively] referable to
the oral contract is satisfied. . . .
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Id. 2 Utah 2d at 45, 269 P.2d at 281. Likewise in Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust
Co., supra, 6 Utah 2d at 24, 305 P.2d at 484
we expressed:
If the contract has great clarity and definiteness, there may be no need for reliance which is exclusively referable to
the contract, so long as performance fulfills the terms.
In light of its history in our cases, the
requirement of exclusive referability is "an
evidentiary requirement of equity that the
facts speak for themselves." 9 Utah Law
Review 91, supra, at 107. The requirement
overcomes "the court's reluctance to prevent the statute from operating on the
basis of purely oral evidence." Id. at 106.
As a corollary, where either independent
acts which prove the contract can be found,
or an admission of the contract is present,
the requirement of exclusive referability
may be relaxed because the evidentiary
concern is assauged by either the admission or the independent acts. Consequently, the more conclusive the direct proof of
the contract, the less stringent the requirement of exclusively referable acts. As Professor Corbin puts it:
If there is ample and convincing direct
testimony less corroboration by circumstances is required. In most cases, such
circumstantial corroboration is indispensable
In great numbers of cases in which the
part performance has been held insufficient on some ground or other and specific enforcement has been refused, the
most compelling factor has been insufficiency of proof, the weakness often lying
in the uncertainty and conflicting character of the direct human testimony itself.
2 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 442 at 528.
[2] In the case at bar the court found
evidence to support a contract between
Martin and Chaffin which was based upon
the testimony of Martin's witnesses:
5. The Court finds that the terms of
the oral contract between Martin and
Chaffin are sufficiently supported by the
testimony of the witnesses William Stanley Bradford, Albert Nielsen, Bill Nielsen

and Eddie Allen, all of whom have no
interest in the outcome of this case, to
meet the burden of persuasion required
by Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co.,
6 Utah 2d 18 [305 P.2d 480], and the
Court therefore finds that the oral agreement was entered into as alleged.
The court also found that Martin relied
upon the oral agreement:
7. From the time Chaffin and Martin
entered into their agreement in the
spring of 1947 until Chaffin's death on
July 30, 1975, Martin worked exclusively
for Chaffin as his foreman in reliance
upon their agreement that the subject
property would be conveyed to Martin.
In reliance on their agreement, Martin
labored 10 to 16 hours per day, 7 days a
week during the summer months and,
occasionally when necessary, worked
around the clock. In the winter time,
Martin labored 8 to 10 hours per day, 7
days a week. During this period of time
Martin's salary ranged from $75 per
month in 1947, to $375 per month in
1975. From 1960 until 1969, Martin received $325 per month without a single
raise. Additionally, it is found that Rodney Martin and his wife Martha, provided
substantial personal services to Chaffin
and that Martin's son Denny performed
substantial labor with respect to the
farming operations on Chaffin's farms
and ranches for which he was not compensated. It is further found that these
services would not have been provided
but for the agreement between Chaffin
and Martin that the subject property was
to be conveyed to Martin.
The court concluded that Martin would not
have continued to work for and provide
personal services to Chaffin except for the
agreement between them.
We respect the court's findings and recognize the deference to be paid to the trial
court who views first-hand the witnesses as
they offer their testimony. We have no
quarrel with his basic findings of the extent of services rendered by Martin to his
employer. However, reviewing the court's
application of our law to those findings, we
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can only conclude that the court erred in its
holding that there was sufficient part performance. The trial court drew one conclusion from Martin's services but that is legally insufficient since they admit of another equally valid and consonant conclusion
against his claim of contract. See Price v.
Lloyd, supra.
The fact that Martin worked for Chaffin
as his foreman is not an exclusively referable act of reliance on the alleged oral
agreement since it was consonant with
Martin's employment.
Martin's long
hours, not atypical of a ranch foreman's
life, were remunerated by salary. Martin's
wife's driving Chaffin to various locations
on occasion and asking him to stay for
dinner when he was at the Martin house
during mealtime were not inconsistent with
good relations between an employer and an
employee and his family. (At least once
Mrs. Martin received compensation for her
efforts). Further, Martin's son was compensated for his labors from the time he
reached the age of fourteen. (In arguing
about the son's testimony, Martin's attorney agreed 'The man has testified he got
paid. I don't think there is any dispute
about it")
Martin's claim that he declined other and
better offers of employment elsewhere to
remain with Chaffin is also unavailing to
prove reliance since, as we quoted earlier,
mere nonaction is insufficient to constitute
part performance. Professor Corbin concurs:
If the performance rendered by the
promisee consists wholly of forbearance
to act, the fact is less likely to be evidential in character than when it consists of
affirmative action.
2 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 430 at 474.
This claim of forbearance is at best highly
equivocal as to Martin's motives.
Of course, the fact that Martin continued
to work long, hard hours for his employer
might be viewed as sufficient reliance had
there been an admission of an oral agreement as in Brinton, supra, or independent
acts pointing to such an agreement as in
Van Natta, supra, where the promisor

leased the property contingent upon the
promisee's return from the army. However, the evidence of the oral contract in
this case required the judge to weigh the
credibility of Martin's witnesses against
witnesses for the Investment Company
who vigorously disputed the existence of
an oral contract. Thus the necessity of
showing acts of part performance which
were exclusively referable to the claimed
agreement remains vital. Yet with only
the foundation of a finding of fact that a
contract was made based upon disputed
testimony that the ranch had been orally
promised to him over 30 years ago, Martin
contends (and the dissenting opinion advocates) that the oral contract should be enforced. None of the case law we have
discussed would permit it. In all of our
cases either the requirement of acts of
exclusive referability was met, or it was
relaxed where there was no evidentiary
concern regarding the existence of a contract. Neither Martin's proof of the oral
contract nor his acts in supposed reliance
so comply.
Even in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust
Co., supra, which is most similar to the
case at bar, the nephew changed the location of his home, and left his business to
become an employee of his aunt's bank so
that he could look after her business in
reliance upon the oral contract. Moreover,
he and his family changed lifestyles to prepare meals and sit home with her at nights
and on holidays. Martin and his family did
not change locations, interrupted no lifestyle and did no other acts that were not
consonant with his job as ranch foreman.
In Randall the contract and its terms were
proved by clear, convincing and unequivocal testimony. We found the evidence to
be sufficient because as we quoted from
the trial court's memorandum decision:
"There is no direct evidence to dispute
any of this testimony, and a careful examination of the transcript certainly
would not justify a concept that the effectiveness of the testimony had been
destroyed on cross examination."
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Id, at 22, 305 P.2d at 483. However, the
testimony of Martin's witnesses as to the
existence of an oral contract was controverted and a major point of dispute of the
lawsuit.1 The trial courts finding of an
oral contract must be followed by a finding
of exclusively referable acts which Martin
has failed to demonstrate. He and his family's acts of labor, neighborliness and forbearance, as we have expressed, were entirely consonant with his employment as
ranch foreman. Even if we follow the
standard advocated in the dissenting opinion (which is mentioned in some of our
cases and by Professor Corbin) that the
acts of part performance need only be "not
readily explainable" or "not reasonably explicable" on some other ground, our result
would not be different. Martin's acts of
claimed part performance of a vigorously
disputed contract are so equivocal that they
do not meet any of those high evidentiary
standards.
We have no quarrel with the argument in
the dissenting opinion that the statute of
frauds should not be used to perpetrate a
fraud upon an innocent and unsuspecting
person such as an employee who renders
services in good faith upon a promised expectation. Such a rule would be easy to
apply if there were some magical way of
determining in each case whether in fact a
contract had indeed been made. We could
then apply the statute as a bar or refuse to
apply it depending upon whether a contract
was in fact made. There being no sureproof method of determining whether a
contract was made, the Legislature has
made it the policy in this state that oral
contracts for the conveyance of land will
not be enforced except where there is sufficient part performance to provide a high
evidentiary basis for their existence. This
policy which the Legislature has translated
into the statute of frauds may well result,
in some cases, in the denial of a benefit to a
well-deserving employee or servant. We
are helpless to prevent that result where
the evidence of part performance of the
1. We find nothing in the record to indicate that
the trial court found the existence of the contract by clear and convincing evidence as stated

claimed contract falls below the high evidentiary standard required by courts of
equity—regardless of the precise words
which they may use in describing that standard. As unfortunate as it would be to
deprive a man who had worked his life in
reliance upon the expectation of receiving
property, it would be equally serious to
take property from an owner after his
death (when he cannot be heard) on the
strength of a questionable oral agreement
supposedly made many years prior. If the
statute of frauds is to be given any force,
we cannot affirm the trial court.
With the exception of Martin's interest in
the Investment Company, the decree is reversed. Costs awarded to appellant.
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, J., concur.
STEWART, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully submit that the majority
assumes the role of a trial court on this
appeal by, in effect, retrying the case on a
critical evidentiary point and ignoring the
trial court's findings of fact which contradict the factual assumptions the majority
makes. The consequence is that a man and
his family who worked seme thirty years
for the deceased George H. Chaffin is deprived of property which was promised to
him in return for his services. In my view,
the statute of frauds, which was designed
to prevent frauds, in effect perpetrates on
the plaintiff the very result which the statute was intended to avoid.
I.
Crucial to this decision is our standard of
review in equity cases. In Jensen v.
Brown, Utah, 639 P.2d 150 (1981), we
recently addressed that standard because
of numerous inconsistent rules as to our
scope of review in equity cases. We reiterated that "we reverse only when the trial
court's finding is against the clear weight
of the evidence." Id. at 152. See also
McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996
in the dissenting opinion. However, this fact is
of no consequence to our decision.
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(1978); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County,
22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969); Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah
2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962).
As the majority states, this Court in
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6
Utah 2d 18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (1956),
enunciated the standard of review in statute of frauds cases:
In an equity review of facts if the
record shows a fair preponderance, or
even if the evidence is balanced evenly,
the trial court findings should be sustained. If the evidence is so vague and
uncertain that the finding is obviously
erroneous, there may be a new finding
on review. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah
520, 94 P.2d 465 [1939]; Morley v. Willden, 120 Utah 423, 235 P.2d 500 [1951];
Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264
P.2d 852 [1953]; Youngren v. King, 1
Utah 2d 386, 267 P.2d 913 [1954].
However, the majority does not hold that
the evidence as to the existence of the
contract or as to any element of the doctrine of part performance is "so vague and
uncertain that the finding is obviously erroneous. " Id. Indeed, the Court does not
hold that any of the findings are inadequately supported by the evidence. Rather, on its own view of the evidence, the
Court simply holds that the plaintiff's conduct was not exclusively referable to the
oral contract, without even acknowledging
that the trial court, in effect, held that it
was exclusively referable on the basis of
substantial evidence.
II.
The majority opinion is primarily devoted
to establishing the proposition that in a
part performance case the plaintiffs conduct relied upon to show part performance
must refer "exclusively" to the contract.
In Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.,
supra, the case relied on by the trial court,
this Court stated that the test for determining the necessary part performance is
whether the plaintiff would not have performed the acts of part performance but
for the contract. The trial court in the

instant case, relying upon Randall, stated
in its findings of fact: "It is further found
that these services would not have been
provided but for the agreement between
Chaffin and Martin that the subject property was to be conveyed to Martin." This
conclusion is based on the following detailed findings of fact:
1. Plaintiff Rodney Martin was employed by the defendant George H. Chaffin in 1932 as a laborer at Chaffin's
quarry located in Lemington, Utah.
Martin continued to work for Chaffin in
that capacity until the fall of 1936 when
Martin left the quarry and began work
as a ranch laborer for Chaffin on Chaffin's farm and ranch properties located in
both Genola and Payson, Utah. In 1938
Martin was made a foreman with respect
to all of Chaffin's farm and ranch properties located in Genola, Utah. In 1947,
Martin became the foreman with respect
to all of Chaffin's farming and ranch
properties and continued in that capacity
until Chaffin's death in 1975; and thereafter until January 1, 1976 for Chaffin's
successor in interest.
2. During the period of time that
Martin worked for Chaffin, Chaffin
owned a number of separate and distinct
parcels of real property, each of which
was referred to by a common name by
Chaffin, his employees and residents of
the community. The parcel which is the
subject of this action consisting of 120
acres located in Utah County, State of
Utah, particularly described as
The Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 34, Township 9
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian and the East half of the
Northwest quarter of Section 34
was commonly referred to by the defendant Chaffin, the plaintiff Martin, Chaffin's employees and others in the community as the home ranch, the home place,
or simply the ranch.
3. In the spring of 1947 Martin and
Chaffin entered into an oral lease agreement under the terms of which Chaffin
agreed (a) to lease three of his parcels of
real property (namely, the 120 acre home
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ranch, which is the subject of this action,
the Staley pasture, and the Nielsen place)
to Martin (b) to stock the properties and
(c) to provide the equipment necessary
for farming operations. In consideration
for this lease, Martin agreed to pay to
Chaffin 50 percent of the profits which
he derived from the operations on these
three parcels of real estate. This oral
lease was unilaterally terminated by
Chaffin approximately four to six weeks
after it was entered into.
4. At the time Chaffin terminated the
above-described oral lease, he requested
that Martin remain in his employment
and act as foreman for all of his farming
and ranch operations. As inducement,
Chaffin offered and promised that in the
event Martin remained with him as his
foreman, he would convey the 120 acres
in Genola commonly known as the "home
place" or "home ranch" to Martin at or
before his (Chaffin's) death and would
raise Martin's salary $25 per month. After several days of deliberation and discussions with his wife, Martin accepted
Chaffin's offer and immediately commenced performance under the terms of
their agreement.
5. The Court finds that the terms of
the oral contract between Martin and
Chaffin are sufficiently supported by the
testimony of the witnesses William Stanley Bradford, Albert Nielsen, Bill Nielsen
and Eddie Allen, all of whom have no
interest in the outcome of this case, to
meet the burden of persuasion required
by Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co.,
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480, and the Court
therefore finds that the oral agreement
was entered into as alleged.
6. The Court further finds the agreement sufficiently complete to support a
decree of specific performance.
7. From the time Chaffin and Martin
entered into their agreement in the
spring of 1947 until Chaffin's death on
July 30, 1975, Martin worked exclusively
for Chaffin as his foreman in reliance
upon their agreement that the subject
property would be conveyed to Martin.
In reliance on their agreement, Martin

labored 10 to 16 hours per day, 7 days a
week during the summer months and,
occasionally when necessary, worked
around the clock. In the winter time,
Martin labored 8 to 10 hours per day, 7
days a week. During this period of time
Martin's salary ranged from $75 per
month in 1947, to $375 per month in
1975. From 1960 until 1969, Martin received $325 per month without a single
raise. Additionally, it is found that Rodney Martin and his wife Martha, provided
substantial personal services to Chaffin
and that Martin's son Denny performed
substantial labor with respect to the
farming operations on Chaffin's farms
and ranches for which he was not compensated. It is further found that these
services would not have been provided
but for the agreement between Chaffin
and Martin that the subject property
ivas to be conveyed to Martin.
8. The Court finds that plaintiff completed his part of the bargain upon the
death of George Chaffin.
9. In 1975 Chaffin died without having conveyed the subject property to
Martin. [Emphasis added.]
It seems to me that unless the Court can
demonstrate that these findings are erroneous, it cannot reverse the trial court without rewriting the standards of review
which govern the relationship between this
Court and the trial courts.
What the majority position essentially
boils down to, as best I understand it, is
that a person who makes an oral contract
with his employer for the conveyance of
land cannot under any circumstances rely
upon his continuation in employment to
show part performance of the oral contract. Perhaps that is an overstatement of
the majority opinion; I certainly hope it is,
but given the trial court's findings, and
specifically the finding that "but for the
agreement between Chaffin and Martin
that the subject property was to be conveyed to Martin," Martin would not have
performed the services which he did, I see
no other alternative.
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The plaintiff claims that he worked ten
to sixteen hours per day, seven days a
week, for nearly thirty years and that the
reasonable value of his thirty years of
work as a farm manager was shown to be
approximately $400,000. The defendants,
of course, denied these allegations, but it is
significant that the trial court declined to
make a finding, proposed by the defendants, that plaintiffs salary was consistently higher than the average salary paid to
farm workers in Utah during the entire
period of his employment.
I submit that the trial court's finding
that the extraordinary services performed
by the plaintiff and his family "would not
have been provided but for the agreement
between Chaffin and Martin that the subject property was to be conveyed to Martin" is simply another way of phrasing the
majority's "exclusively referable" standard
in cases of this type where an employee is
induced to stay on working for another on
the strength of a promise of a future conveyance. The test employed by the trial
court is a stringent test—stringent enough
to meet the basic policy underlying exceptions to the statute of frauds. It is a test
that would avoid fraud and is also appropriate in light of the fact that a plaintiff in
such circumstances as the instant is not
likely to be able to show much stronger
proof of part performance or substantial
reliance than was shown here. Moreover,
the "but for" test rests squarely on the
authority of Randall v. Tracy Collins
Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 24, 305 P.2d 480,
484 (1956).
III.
The majority concedes that although the
"exclusively referable" doctrine is sometimes made an element of the part performance doctrine, as it is generally phrased, it
need not be so if evidence is strong enough
that an oral contract for the conveyance of
land was entered into.
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and less stringent rule for sufficient part
performance. Professor Corbin states the
general rule as follows:
(1) The performance must be in pursuance of the contract and in reasonable reliance thereon
(2) The performance must be such that the remedy
of restitution is not reasonably adequate
(3) The performance must be one
that is in some degree evidential of the
existence of a contract and not readily
explainable on any other ground.
2 Corbin on Contracts § 425 (1950) (emphasis added).1
The third element of the rule of part
performance as stated by Corbin does not
require that the performance be "exclusively referable" to the contract, only that it be
"in some degree evidential" of the contract's existence and "not readily explainable on any other ground." This standard,
which is clearly lower than the "exclusively
referable" test, has been previously articulated by this Court. E.g., Ravarino v.
Price, 123 Utah 559, 575, 260 P.2d 570, 578
(1953) (part performance must be "clearly
referable" to contract).
The rationale behind the "clearly referable standard" is that often evidence of the
contract is not adequately proved by evidence independent of the part performance,
and part performance in such circumstances acts as additional proof of the contract
"[T]he part performance must be clearly
evidential of the existence of a contract—it
must be such as would not ordinarily have
taken place in the absence of a contract
and therefore is not reasonably explicable
on some other grounds." 2 Corbin on
Contracts, supra, § 430 at 473.

The "exclusively referable" doctrine is a
special application of a generally broader

However, where the existence of the contract is clearly shown by independent evidence, this standard is relaxed. Thus, Corbin states:
It has been held in a well reasoned
case that the performance rendered by
the plaintiff need not be such as to be
referable to the contract in the sense

1. The majority quotes the same passage in its
opinion, but it also quotes a far more strict

statement of the standard from C.J.S., Statute of
Frauds, § 250, which it seems to follow.
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that it is clearly evidential that the alleged contract was made, if the defendant admits the making of such a contract
but differs as to a part of its terms. The
admission itself relates the performance
to the contract and makes unnecessary
any other proof of the terms so far as
they are admitted.
2 Cor bin on Contracts, supra, § 430 at
475.
By its rigid application of the "exclusively referable test/' the majority raises the
standard of proof in cases such as the
instant case to a level that is unnecessarily
high. In cases where the existence of the
contract has already been proved by independent evidence, as in the instant case,
the exclusively referable test in effect requires that the plaintiff "reprove" the existence of the contract by part performance. Even when the proof of the existence of the contract is somewhat in doubt,
the majority requires corroboration by a
standard much stricter than the one Corbin
suggests. Concededly, where there is no
other evidence of the contract, the "exclusively referable" test is an appropriate test.
However, in this case there is other evidence of the contract.
Utah cases are in accord with the principle stated by Corbin. In In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954), the
seller in an oral contract to convey land
contended that because certain improvements to property by the buyer were not
"exclusively referable" to the contract, the
contract should not be enforced. We held
that because the seller's own testimony
established that an oral contract existed,
the exclusively referable rule did not apply,
even though "it might be possible to explain the taking of possession and the making of improvements on some other basis
than that a contract existed." Id. at 44,
269 P.2d at 281. We cited with approval
holdings from other jurisdictions that
where the existence of the oral contract
is established by an admission of the
party resisting specific performance or
by competent evidence independent of
the acts of part performance, the re-

quirement that the acts of part performance must be exclusively] referable to
the oral contract is satisfied.
Id. (emphasis added), citing Jones v. Jones,
333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933); Higgins
v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 142 Misc. 69, 253
N.Y.S. 859 (1931). Similarly, in Randall v.
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 24,
305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956), we stated:
If the contract has great clarity and
definiteness, there may be no need for
reliance which is exclusively referable to
the contract, so long as performance fulfills the terms.
Accord Van Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah
376, 195 P. 192 (1920); Brinton v. Van
Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218 (1893).
Of the cases cited by the majority which
are apparently to the contrary, two are
distinguishable. In Holmgren
Brothers
Inc. v. Ballard, Utah, 534 P.2d 611 (1975),
the issue was not whether the part performance was exclusively referable, but
whether a contract existed at all. Although the evidence showed that an oral
contract to convey land had originally existed, the buyer later repudiated the contract
by refusing to accept the proferred conveyance. We held that the buyer's weeding
and discing of the land was not sufficient
evidence to prove the contract. Jackson v.
Jackson, 122 Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953),
is also distinguishable on the ground that
the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of
an oral contract to make a will.
The only cases actually to the contrary
are McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment Corp., Utah, 631 P.2d 851 (1981);
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d
570 (1953); and Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86,
86 P. 767 (1906). The rule in those cases is
that even where the existence of an oral
contract is clearly and convincingly proved
by evidence independent of the part performance, the part performance must be
shown to be exclusively referable to the
contract. The rationale is that the part
performance doctrine is essentially one of
estoppel, Ravarino v. Price, supra, 123
Utah at 567, 260 P.2d at 574, and that the
referability of the past performance must
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be shown in order to establish the requisite
reliance on the contract. In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269 P.2d 278, 281
(1954). I submit that such an emphasis on
estoppel is misplaced and that it should be
weighed along with other pertinent factors.
If these cases are followed, even when
significant substantial part performance
has been rendered, the door is open for a
defendant to deny a valid oral contract
simply because he is able to conjure up a
motive for the plaintiffs performance that
is not exclusively referable to the contract.
As Corbin states in the section entitled
"Oral Contracts to Transfer Land in Return for Services":
Where the making of the oral contract is
proved beyond any reasonable doubt, and
where the services have been long[,] continued, onerous, and of a kind incapable
of just estimation in money, the chancellor's conscience will be so moved as to
lead to the conclusion that it is a "virtual
fraud" for the defendant to hide behind
the statute.
2 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 435 at
498.
The rule should be that if clear and convincing evidence proves the existence of
the contract, then it is sufficient for the
plaintiff to show that the part performance
is "clearly referable" to the contract, i.e.,
was clearly in reliance on the contract or in
accordance with the terms of the contract.
The opposing party should then have the
burden of proving alternate explanations, if
any exist, for the part performance. In
fact, defendants in the instant case attempted to do this, and the trial court refused to find in their favor.

jority's own standard, then, the question
here is whether the testimony was sufficiently "ample and direct" to prove, clearly
and convincingly, that Chaffin contracted
with the plaintiff to give him the "home
place" when Chaffin died if the plaintiff
would stay on as Chaffin's foreman.
The trial court was persuaded that the
independent testimony of four disinterested
witnesses proved the existence of such an
oral contract between Martin and Chaffin.
(See the trial court's finding of fact number
five, quoted above.) William Bradford, a
former employee of Chaffin, testified that
in 1955 "[Chaffin] told me that if Rod
stayed with him (Chaffin) he was going to
get the Genola Home Place." Bradford
had two other conversations with Chaffin,
one in the late 1940's and one in 1965,
which confirmed Chaffin's intent to leave
the land in question to the plaintiff.
Albert Nielsen, a neighbor, testified that
about six months before Chaffin died Nielsen asked to purchase ten acres of the land
in question. Chaffin refused because when
he died "[the land] belonged to Rod Martin."
Bill Nielsen, the son of AJbert and also a
neighbor, asked Chaffin in about 1970 or
1971 if he could buy some ground. Nielsen
testified "[Chaffin] said he couldn't sell it
because it was promised to Rod." This
was confirmed by an earlier conversation
between Bill Nielsen and Chaffin one summer when Bill had been an employee.
Finally, Eddie Allen, another former employee, testified that in about 1957 Chaffin
had said that Martin "will get this place
some day."

The majority concedes that "the more
conclusive the direct proof of the contract,
the less stringent the requirement of exclusively referrable acts." It then quotes
with approval Corbin's statement that "[i]f
there is ample and convincing direct testimony [then] less corroboration by circumstances is required." Even by the ma-

The trial court, on the basis of what I
think is clear and convincing evidence,
found that the contract alleged by plaintiff
in fact existed. The majority discounts
that finding and the supporting testimony
and rules in effect that the evidence was
not sufficiently clear and direct to establish
the disputed contract.2 It states that "the

2. The majority states in footnote 1 that "[w]e
find nothing in the record to indicate that the
trial court found the existence of the contract by

clear and convincing evidence as stated in the
dissenting opinion." The trial court did not
invoke that phrase, but the testimony of the
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existence of the oral contract was controverted and a major point of dispute in the
lawsuit." It also implies in quoting from
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co. that
the above-summarized testimony was disputed by direct evidence, and that its effectiveness was "destroyed on cross-examination."
On the contrary, the record shows that
the defendant did not destroy the testimony of plaintiffs witnesses by cross-examination, and the trial court impliedly so
found. Thus, what the majority does is
retry this case by reweighing the credibility of the witnesses. That is not the prerogative of this Court, irrespective of the
fact that this is an action in equity.
Although I recognize that Chaffin (i.e.,
the deceased) performed acts on occasion
which were not necessarily consistent with
the existence of the contract conveying the
property to plaintiff, I submit, on the other
hand, that neither were those acts necessarily inconsistent with the existence of the
contract. In any event, given the existence
of the contract, Chaffin's subsequent conduct did not have the effect of either vitiating it or proving that it did not exist.
What is critical, and is clear in the record,
is that the plaintiff devoted his whole life
to maintaining the deceased's farm as if it
were the plaintiffs own farm. The trial
court's finding that plaintiff would not
have spent "his lifetime as he did but for"
the existence of the contract should be
dispositive.
I respectfully submit that the doctrine of
part performance in this case has been
construed so narrowly that it has failed to
achieve its intended purpose of avoiding
application of the statute of frauds with
such rigor as to produce the very kind of
fraud that the statute was intended to prevent.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of STEWART, J.
witnesses referred to in Finding of Fact No. 5r
quoted above in its entirety, was not controverted and, together with the conceded acts of the

AUTO WEST, INC., Charles Bryan, Paul
Graff and Norman P. Stephens, Plaintiffs, Counter-defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
v.
Richard BAGGS, Defendant, Counterclaimant, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.
No. 17984.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 23, 1984.

Auto dealership and shareholders commenced action against another shareholder,
who was also general manager, seeking
termination of proxies held by defendant,
accounting, and return of all moneys improperly taken from dealership. Defendant filed answer and counterclaimed
alleging slander. After bench trial, the
Fifth District Court, Iron County, Robert
F. Owens, J., awarded plaintiffs $6,334.12
in damages, and awarded defendant $25,000 damages for slander, and appeals were
taken. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) circuit court judge was properly appointed to sit as district court judge;
(2) protection of interests of all parties in
maintaining dealership franchise was sufficient to support irrevocability of proxies
given to defendant; (3) proxies terminated
by operation of law; and (4) evidence was
sufficient to support finding that defendant
was slandered.
Affirmed.
Hall, C.J., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, in which Howe
and Durham, JJ., joined.

1. Judges <£=>3
Where appointment of circuit judge
was not pursuant to statute governing applaintiff, consisted of evidence that
meets that standard.
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So, your intention was to sell the water with the lots, as
you said in your affidavit?
A

No, we did not sell it with the lots.

Q

You're saying that the affidavit --

A

I mean --

Q

The affidavit is false?

A

Now, ask -- please ask that question again.

Q

You're saying in your affidavit you signed in 1988

that you sold lots, or you subdivided and platted the Rocky
Top Subdivision, with the intent of selling platted lots with
water developed from your interest in the Rose Spring.
That's what you said in 1988.
A

Is that true or false?

I still don't quite understand.

That we sold the

water with the lots?
Q

That you developed -- you subdivided and platted

Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of selling platted lots
with water developed from the Rose Spring.

Is that true, as

you said in 1988?
A

"We would sell them water rights, but we didn't sell

the water with the lots.
Q

So it's your testimony today that what you said in

19 88 was wrong?
A

I suppose I'm perjured.
THE COURT:

What's the objection?
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MS. DRAGOO:

The objection is it mischaracterized

the testimony.
THE COURT:

If she doesn't understand the question,

she can say she can't answer it.

The objection is overruled

on mischaracterization.
Q

(BY MR. RAMPTON)

Do you understand my question?

A

No, I don't.

Q

And I want to make sure that you are clear on this

point.

In 1988, you said, under oath, that you subdivided

and platted the Rocky Top Subdivision with the intent of
selling platted lots with water developed from your interest
in the Rose Spring.

That's what you said in 1988.

Was that

true?
A

If it's got it here, in 1988 we was still in court

with Bleazards.

That's when he said, "leave it alone or I'll

have you in court."

I'm seventy years old.

I don't

understand like you guys.
Q

Well, I'm --

A

But we were still in court with Bleazard in 19 88, so

it I'm -- if I've made a mistake, I did.
Q

Let's go on to Paragraph 9 in the affidavit,

Mrs. Warr.

You have already testified that, at the time that

you signed this affidavit, you sold six lots; Spears, Teresa,
Brenda, Howard, Wayne Reynolds, and the Crittendens' lots to
them.
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A
'

Q

Yes.
They•re - - this affidavit, in Paragraph 9, you say,

quote:

We have sold six of the eleven lots in the Rocky Top
Subdivision upon our representation that gravity
flow irrigation water would be provided to such
lots from our interest in the Rose Spring.

Period, end quote.
A

Is that what you said in 1988?

Well, that was our intention:

If we had the water,

they would have it.
THE COURT:

Let me ask you a question.

subsequently got the water.

You

How did your intention change

after you got the water?
A

This was in 1984?
THE COURT:

No, this is was made in 1988.

THE WITNESS:

No, we was - - w e didn't settle with

Bleazard until 1990.
THE COURT:

You settled with Bleazard in 1990.

Did

your intent change in any respect, or what you had said in
this affidavit?
THE WITNESS:

If we got the water, got it down here,

that the plaintiffs were always told that they would have
their irrigation water, but it would not be free.

97

TabD

the well -- or, is the allocation of 40 percent,
THE WITNESS:
the flow was.

That's right.

We did not know what

We did not quantify that.

We were aware it

was less than four second feet.
THE COURT:

Right.

But there's a benefit to the

property owners to convert it into their well because they
can draw more total water out.
THE WITNESS:
Q

That's right.

(BY MS. DRAGOO)

Turning to Exhibit 78, do you

have that in your book?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

All right.

A

This is a copy of the list of names that Hazel gave

What is that exhibit?

me for whom to prepare quit claim deeds.
Q

Was this 1993?

A

I believe so.

Q

If you would refer to Exhibit 92.

This deed refers

to 7.5 percent.
A

Yes, it does.

Q

How did this come about?

A

After I had prepared the first round, the quit claim

deeds, I believe Hazel and Clayton made some effort to convey
those.
I made it a point to avoid getting involved in the
commercial terms of that.

They came back to me about a year
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later and asked me to prepare some more deeds, I think
because they had new names, either through lot sales or
something along those lines•
I had had the time to think about the issue a little
bit, and suggested that rather than giving enough water to
irrigate an entire five acres, when it came time to prove
beneficial use, we would probably lose some of that right
through the construction of paved and unirrigated areas on
the lots; driveways, road way, barns, corrals, house.
And I proposed preserving as much of the water right
as we could, and cut back the amount of water being conveyed
by these deeds to .75.

This would be enough to irrigate

four-and-a-half acres.
Combined with the quarter-acre with domestic water
right would be four and three-quarters acres irrigated area
on a five-acre lot.
The balance would not have irrigation rights to it,
but would probably be occupied by unirrigated areas anyway.
Q

Have you done any further testing of flows of the

spring?
A

No, I have not.

Q

And will -- once you prepared those quit claim deeds

in "94 from 7.5 percent, did you then prepare quit claim
deeds for several other owners besides the exhibit that we've
mentioned?
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A

I believe there were several quit claim deeds at

that time; I don't recall who or how many.
Q

Would you turn to Exhibit 80?
THE COURT:

You have proved up the amount of use

that's being done on the Howard property after, with this
higher draw?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

No, only for his domestic water right.

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

No proof would be called for until

after he had an approved application.
THE COURT:
Q

Yes.

Did you prepare this quit claim deed to Melvin

Spears?
A

It looks like one that I prepared, yes.

Q

And that's the same type of quit claim deed you

prepared in '94?
A

This was ours, of 1993 issue.

Q

Right.

Did you also prepare a change application

based on these quit claim deeds?
A

In my deposition I denied remembering such, but

after the deposition, I went through my personal files on
these matters.

I went through those files step by step, and

found that I had a draft for a change application.
I also had a plot report showing the water users in
the vicinity, which would have probably been reference
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